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“Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse” – 
Mezzanatto Waivers as Lynchpin of 
Prosecutorial Overreach 
Christopher B. Mueller* 
ABSTRACT 
Plea bargaining is the dominant means of disposing of criminal charges 
in the United States, in both state and federal courts.  This administrative 
mechanism has become a system that is grossly abusive of individual rights, 
leading to many well-known maladies of the criminal justice system, which 
include overcharging, overincarceration, convictions on charges that would 
likely fail at trial, and even conviction of “factually innocent” persons.  In-
strumental in the abuses of plea bargaining is the so-called Mezzanatto waiv-
er, which takes its name from a 1995 Supreme Court decision that approved 
the practice of getting defendants to agree that anything they say in negotia-
tions with prosecutors can be admitted against them if a trial ensues, despite 
Evidence Rule 410, which provides that such statements are inadmissible.  
These waivers, which are largely overlooked in the vast literature that criti-
cizes plea bargaining, are in fact lynchpins in a system that is horrifying to 
contemplate. 
These waivers mean that the very act of negotiation almost guarantees 
conviction of something, imposing one-sided risks on defendants that can 
only benefit prosecutors.  They amount to a kind of palpable unfairness that 
the system tolerates.  They not only contribute to the maladies described 
above, but they produce rulings (if a trial goes forward) that admit unreliable 
statements.  There are many reasons why these waivers should be disap-
proved, including policy arguments (they are unfair, produce bad results and 
unreliable statements) and arguments based on contract law, on Rule 410 
itself, on a widely-recognized but seldom enforced “unitary” principle, and – 
finally – on the “Mezzanatto proviso” (a widely ignored term in the decision 
itself). 
 
*Henry S. Lindsley Professor of Law at University of Colorado School of Law (since 
1985).  I wish to extend my deep thanks to Al Alschuler, Fred Bloom, Justin De-
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and commenting on an earlier version of this manuscript.  I also want to thank Colo-
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This Article explores the origins and operation of Mezzanatto waivers, 
examines and expounds the reasons for disapproving them and taking a new 
direction, and offers a reply to standard arguments that prosecutors need 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
It is inherently unfair for the government to engage in [plea 
bargaining], only to use it as a weapon against the defendant 
when negotiations fail.  
United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771, 775 (5th Cir. 1974) 
 
Everyone who saw The Godfather in theaters or on television remem-
bers what Michael Corleone told Kay Adams in explaining how Michael’s 
father persuaded a Hollywood agent to release Johnny Fontane from an iron-
clad contract.  The agent agreed to release Fontane because he was led to 
understand that either his signature or his brains would be on the paper – that 
was the offer he couldn’t refuse. 
Federal prosecutors (and some state prosecutors) enjoy similar powers, 
allowing them to exert as much muscle over defendants as Vito Corleone 
(Michael’s father) exerted over the agent.  Here is how it happens: Before 
sitting down to talk, the prosecutor asks the defendant (usually with his law-
yer present) to sign a waiver as part of a proffer agreement, under which he 
promises to speak truthfully and agrees that everything he says can be offered 
in evidence against him if a trial should eventuate.  What we have is often 
called a “proffer waiver” or “advance waiver” that is signed before the prose-
cutor offers a plea agreement or even suggests that a plea agreement might be 
acceptable and before the defendant makes the statements covered by his 
waiver.  If ensuing discussions fail to bear fruit, or if they lead to a plea 
agreement but one of the parties backs out (even if the defendant does so with 
the court’s permission after entering a plea), the waiver is usually enforceable 
anyway. 
Alternatively, the prosecutor and defendant (with counsel) sit down to 
talk, and the conversation leads to a plea agreement that includes a waiver, 
this time covering everything that the defendant has said in the conversations 
(and sometimes what he says thereafter too), and often stipulations of fact, 
allowing the use of all this material in evidence against him if a trial should 
eventuate.  What we have here is often called a “plea bargain waiver,” ob-
tained as part of a plea agreement. 
Perhaps it is an exaggeration to say that the cost of talking to the prose-
cutor, or at least the cost of reaching a deal in this system, is that the defend-
ant will certainly be convicted of something – but it is not much of an exag-
geration.  A defendant who wants a deal – and all of them do – knows he 
must incriminate himself in order to enter a plea.  He must do so because a 
court will not accept a plea unless it is satisfied on the basis of statements by 
the defendant in court – plea “allocutions,” as they are called (the defendant is 
not subject to cross), that repeat what he told the prosecutor and show his 
guilt.  The reason prosecutors insist on a waiver is to force the defendant to 
make a plea or to nail him to the plea that he agrees to make.  Without the 
waiver, what the defendant says to the prosecutor would be excludable as 
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plea bargaining statements under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.1  
So the defendant signs a waiver and speaks his piece (or speaks his piece, 
then signs a waiver), knowing he is incriminating himself but hoping that he 
will get a good deal or that the one he has struck will prove good and win the 
court’s approval. 
If this system sounds unfair, there is a good reason: It is unfair, as the 
Ross case quoted at the beginning of this article recognized in 1974.  Of 
course we cannot aspire to create “market conditions” in which the prosecutor 
and defense have “equal bargaining power.”  The state (both federal and state 
governments) has a monopoly on police power, courts, and the prosecutorial 
function, and the risks to the defendant (incarceration or even death) are in-
commensurable with the risks to the prosecutor (failing to represent the pub-
lic interest adequately, or perhaps frustration of political ambitions or even 
loss of a job).  But we can aspire to a system in which the state cannot merci-
lessly exploit this imbalance in the extreme way that the waiver doctrine in-
vites.  And we can aspire to a system in which the mere act of trying to reach 
a compromise does not prejudice one of the two parties and in which the 
mechanism for determining guilt or innocence when bargaining fails is not 
corrupted by the bargaining itself. 
Bargaining in the setting of defense waivers, as described above, goes 
forward across the country every day, particularly in the federal system (in 
some states too), probably thousands of times a year.  Prosecutors had begun 
to get defendants to sign waivers before the decision in Mezzanatto, but that 
decision so strongly reinforced this technique that it quickly became com-
monplace in the federal system and spread to many states as well.  Plea bar-
gaining has generated a vast literature, much of it critical, and Mezzanatto too 
has been dissected from several perspectives,2 but its pivotal role in a system 
that is operating badly has never been adequately examined. 
 
 1. FED. R. EVID. 410(a)(4) [hereinafter “FRE”] (providing that evidence of “a 
statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authori-
ty” is excludable in civil and criminal cases “if the discussions did not result in a 
guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea”). 
 2. See David P. Leonard, Waiver of Protections Against the Use of Plea Bar-
gains and Plea Bargaining Statements After Mezzanatto, 23 CRIM. JUST. 8 (2008) 
(outlining defense strategies for dealing with Mezzanatto waivers); Eric Ras-
musen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1541 (1998) (analyzing waivers from law and economics perspective); Christopher P. 
Siegle, Note, United States v. Mezzanatto: Effectively Denying Yet Another Proce-
dural Safeguard to “Innocent” Defendants, 32 TULSA L.J. 119 (1996) (analyzing 
issues of contract and fairness in Mezzanatto waivers); Pamela Bennett Louis, Note, 
United States v. Mezzanatto: An Unheeded Plea to Keep the Exclusionary Provisions 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(E)(6) 
Intact, 17 PACE L. REV. 231, 271 (1996) (concluding that Mezzanatto eviscerated 
Rule 410 and ignored legislative intent); Jason A. Manekas, Case Comment, United 
States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995), 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 338 (1995) (argu-
ing that Mezzanatto ignored legislative intent behind Rule 410). 
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In what follows, this Article begins by looking at the decision in Mezza-
natto.  This Article then describes the settings and manner in which Mezza-
natto waivers operate and sets out the reasons why current law works badly 
and needs reform.  Mezzanatto waivers make the plea bargaining process 
unfair and exacerbate its dysfunctionalities (overcharging, over-convicting, 
and overincarceration).  These waivers produce untrustworthy statements that 
are then offered against the rare defendant who dares go to trial, including the 
defendant whose bargain has broken down for any reason.  Often these waiv-
ers rest on nonexistent or illusory consideration and should not be enforceable 
as contracts.  Finally, they violate Evidence Rule 410, and it is here that the 
unfairness described above becomes most visible.  Under what this Article 
calls the “unitary principle,” recognized by the Supreme Court ninety years 
ago and still invoked in modern opinions (but often ignored), and under what 
this Article calls the “Mezzanatto proviso,” there is room to take a new direc-
tion. 
This Article concludes by outlining a better way: Mezzanatto waivers 
should be unenforceable whenever bargaining or a plea deal breaks down, 
whether the reason is that the parties cannot reach a deal, or that the prosecu-
tor or defendant withdraws, or that the court rejects the plea.  Under the uni-
tary principle, the waiver should be inoperative in all these situations, and the 
Mezzanatto proviso leaves room to render the waiver inoperative whenever a 
defendant justifiably withdraws from a deal or plea or the court refuses to 
honor a deal.  Equally important, prosecutors do not need waivers to ensure 
cooperation by defendants in the trials of others (a common condition in such 
arrangements), and refusing to enforce waivers would contribute significantly 
to repairing a system that works badly. 
II.  HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
A.  The Mezzanatto Case 
1.  The Holding 
The critical point is the Mezzanatto case, decided in 1995.3  There the 
Supreme Court reviewed a federal drug conviction and concluded that de-
fendants can waive their right under Evidence Rule 410 to exclude statements 
they make to government lawyers during plea negotiations and can do so in 
advance, on the threshold of conversations.  Actually, the issue was narrower: 
The government insisted only that defendants can waive their right to exclude 
such statements if they later testify and say something inconsistent with what 
they said before (the Court dealt only with the impeaching use of plea bar-
gaining statements). 
Seven Justices signed the majority opinion by Justice Thomas conclud-
ing that defendants can waive this right, but five Justices wrote separately.  
 
 3. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). 
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Three of them (Justices Ginsburg, O’Connor, and Breyer) concurred in Jus-
tice Thomas’ opinion but stressed that they were not agreeing to a broader 
waiver that would let the government use such statements during its case-in-
chief.  Two others (Justices Souter and Stevens) dissented and would not 
even agree to the narrow holding allowing the impeaching use of plea bar-
gaining statements. 
Mezzanatto was not the first decision approving waivers of the protec-
tion of Rule 410.  As early as 1987, cases took this direction.4  But Mezzanat-
to is the decisive case, and it reduced Rule 410 to a default provision – in 
federal courts, really a dead letter.  Rule 410 had been enacted twenty years 
earlier, along with Rule 408 covering civil settlement negotiations, with the 
idea of encouraging both sides to sit down and talk by making such negotia-
tions risk free, so that if the parties could not agree on a deal they would be 
placed back on square one – as though nothing had happened.  Now, thanks 
to Mezzanatto, federal courts in many follow-up opinions have done what the 
three concurring Justices feared – broadening waivers to cover use of the 
defendant’s statements during the prosecutor’s case-in-chief.5  Other federal 
courts have approved use of the defendant’s statements to rebut any kind of 
defense evidence.6  Not surprisingly, many federal decisions follow Mezza-
natto in approving use of the defendant’s statements for the purpose of im-
peachment.7 
Some states not only follow Mezzanatto but adopt the broadest possible 
interpretation of the decision in allowing even the use of the defendant’s plea 
bargaining statements as substantive evidence,8 but others disapprove Mezza-
natto waivers or at least limit their operation in various ways (often allowing 
 
 4. United States v. Nemetz, Crim. A. No. 87–196–C, 1987 WL 17543, at *3 (D. 
Mass. Sept. 21, 1987) (finding that proffer letter waived right to exclude plea bargain-
ing statements for impeachment on cross); see also United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 
1380, 1396 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that plea agreements “commonly contain” waivers 
of right to use plea bargaining statements to impeach); United States v. Wood, 879 
F.2d 927, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting claimed waiver). 
 5. The author has found reported decisions by courts in the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia and the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits allowing waivers covering substantive use of the defend-
ant’s statements.  See Appendix 1, infra. 
 6. The author has found reported decisions by courts in the Second, Third, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits approving waivers covering use of the 
defendant’s statements to rebut the prosecutor’s evidence.  See Appendix 2, infra. 
 7. The author has found reported decisions by courts in the First, Second, Third, 
and Seventh Circuits approving waivers covering the impeaching use of the defend-
ant’s statements.  See Appendix 3, infra. 
 8. The author has found reported decisions approving waivers allowing sub-
stantive use of the defendant’s statements in the following ten states: Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, and South Dakota.  See Appendix 4, infra. 
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only impeaching use of plea bargaining statements),9 and yet others appear 
not to have confronted the question.10 
2.  The Case Itself 
It is important to take a closer look at the opinion that became a modern 
Pandora’s Box.  To begin with, Mezzanatto was a drug prosecution, which in 
today’s world puts it in the largest single category of federal criminal cases 
(accounting for almost one third of prosecutions).11  And the case began with 
a proffer session aimed at plea bargaining, which in today’s world resolves 
almost all criminal cases in both state and federal courts.  While it could once 
be said that plea bargaining is “an important part” of the criminal justice sys-
tem, now it is closer to the truth to say that plea bargaining is the criminal 
justice system.12  Law students and the general public watch and study and 
marvel at the protections that our Bill of Rights accords to criminal defend-
ants, but these rights have little room to operate in today’s plea bargaining 
system. 
As wonderfully described by Christopher Slobogin,13 the Mezzanatto 
case began when a federal task force, acting in pursuit of one Gordon Shuster, 
wound up negotiating both with Shuster and later with Gary Mezzanatto, 
each of whom pointed his finger at the other in order to improve his own 
chances for release or at least favorable treatment.  Shuster was living in a 
trailer in rural California near San Diego.  When arrested in a raid, he decided 
to help himself by arranging, with the cooperation of federal agents, for Mez-
zanatto to deliver methamphetamine in a set-up designed to lead to his arrest.  
At the time, as Slobogin recounts the story, Mezzanatto was a married but 
 
 9. The author has found reported decisions approving waivers covering the 
impeaching use of the defendant’s statements in three states: Colorado, Maryland, and 
New Jersey.  See Appendix 5, infra. 
 10. The author could not find reported opinions addressing these issues in the 
following states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 11. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2016 at 2 (2017), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2017/FY16_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf (finding drug cases 
account for 31.6% of federal criminal cases; immigration cases were second at 29.6%, 
and firearms offenses were third at 10.8%). 
 12. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (arguing that plea bargaining “is not some adjunct to the crim-
inal justice system; it is the criminal justice system”). 
 13. Christopher Slobogin, The Story of Rule 410 and United States v. Mezzanat-
to: Using Plea Statements at Trial, in EVIDENCE STORIES 103, 103–26 (Richard Lem-
pert ed., 2006). 
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unemployed Vietnam combat veteran who had started working in some fash-
ion for Shuster.  When it came his turn to talk to the prosecutor, Mezzanatto 
claimed to be doing handyman jobs and said he thought Shuster was involved 
in making explosives and that the package Mezzanatto agreed to deliver con-
tained explosives and not drugs.  Surprisingly, the government broke off its 
conversations with Mezzanatto when it concluded that he was lying on what 
seems a fairly minor point: Mezzanatto said he had not been to Shuster’s 
trailer in the prior week, but one of the agents had seen his car there the day 
before his arrest. 
At the beginning of their conversation, Mezzanatto agreed orally to the 
waiver that the decision bearing his name has made famous.  In today’s 
world, the procedure is elaborate, and the Justice Department has detailed 
written guidelines and forms of written agreements that defendants are effec-
tively required to sign if they desire a resolution.14  In attendance at these 
proffer sessions are the defendant, his lawyer, the prosecutor (in the federal 
system, typically an Assistant U.S. Attorney, as in Mezzanatto itself), and 
investigating agents. 
At the urging of his public defender, Mezzanatto was interested in a 
deal, apparently in the mistaken belief that he was facing a maximum sen-
tence of five years.15  Then Mezzanatto learned that the maximum was ten 
years, and he received jailhouse advice that he needed a “real lawyer” to rep-
resent him.  He changed his mind about a plea, hired a different lawyer, and 
went to trial.  He took the stand and presented his version of events, including 
claims that he worked for Shuster as a handyman, that he knew nothing about 
Shuster’s involvement in drugs, and that he thought Shuster was a shipbuilder 
and explosives expert working for the CIA!  Further, Mezzanatto testified 
that his involvement in drugs was personal, not commercial, and that he be-
lieved his deliveries to be explosives, not drugs.  On cross, the government 
attacked on multiple fronts.  Included were questions asking about statements 
during his proffer session: There he said he had gotten the package from 
“Uncle Bob” (the man who had introduced Mezzanatto to Shuster), and – 
more importantly – there he admitted knowing the package contained meth-
amphetamine.  Mezzanatto also admitted that during the proffer session he 
had said nothing about explosives.  The jury, as Slobogin reports, returned 
with a conviction in less than an hour. 
 
 14. See Principles of Federal Prosecution, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 16, 
2016), www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-
27.420 (it is “particularly important that the defendant not be permitted to enter a 
guilty plea under circumstances that will allow him or her later to proclaim lack of 
culpability or even complete innocence”). 
 15. Slobogin, supra note 13, at 111–17. 
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3.  The Mezzanatto Appeal; The Mezzanatto Proviso 
Mezzanatto appealed.  The Ninth Circuit invalidated the waiver and re-
versed.  The court stressed the clarity of congressional intent to block the 
impeaching use of plea bargaining statements under Rule 410 and argued that 
the purpose of encouraging plea bargaining would be frustrated if either side 
could be forced to bear the risk that anything said in a failed bargaining ses-
sion could be offered in evidence.16  But the case went to the Supreme Court, 
which reinstated Mezzanatto’s conviction. 
The Court began with an unexceptionable point: Important constitution-
al rights are waivable.  It went on to a more remarkable argument, which 
began with the proposition that prosecutors may be reluctant to enter into plea 
bargaining unless they can obtain waivers of the right of the defendant to 
exclude what he says (they face “painfully delicate” choices in deciding who 
should be charged and who should get deals).  Then switching to the defense 
side, the Court said it “makes no sense” to limit what defendants can offer: 
“[I]f the prosecutor is interested in ‘buying’ the reliability assurance that ac-
companies a waiver agreement, then precluding waiver can only stifle the 
market for plea bargains.” 
In an important passage at the end of its opinion, the Mezzanatto majori-
ty rejected the argument that the “mere potential” for prosecutorial abuse 
invalidates waivers.  Instead, the Court said, most prosecutors are “faithful to 
their duty,” and the possibility of a waiver being unknowing or involuntary 
should not invalidate all waivers.  The appropriate response, said the Court, is 
to permit “case-by-case inquiries into whether waiver agreements are the 
product of fraud or coercion.”  Waivers are “valid and enforceable” in the 
absence of some “affirmative indication” that they were entered into “un-
knowingly or involuntarily.”17 
These terms suggest the constitutional standard18 adopted in the Hender-
son case in 1976, under which a guilty plea must be “voluntary in a constitu-
tional sense.”19  Henderson involved a plea of guilty to second-degree mur-
der, and the opinion held that the plea must constitute “an intelligent admis-
sion” that defendant committed the offense, meaning that the defendant must 
understand the required element of intent in the charge and must admit that he 
intended to cause the death of the victim.  Six years earlier the Court had held 
in Brady that pleas (and plea agreements) can be voluntary if the defendant is 
represented by counsel even if he acts in fear of the death penalty, in the be-
lief that the judge will be more lenient than a jury, or because he wants to get 
 
 16. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1454–56 (9th Cir. 1993), 
rev’d, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). 
 17. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 207–11 (1995). 
 18. The Court does not cite constitutional decisions.  Instead it cites Town of 
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (plurality opinion construing 42 U.S.C. § 
1983); United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1 (1926) (construing Trading 
with the Enemy Act). 
 19. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644–45 (1976). 
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other charges dropped.20  Brady stopped short of endorsing an escalation of 
charges where a defendant declines to plead, but the Court addressed this 
tactic eight years later in Bordenkircher.  In Bordenkircher, the Court af-
firmed a conviction carrying a life sentence after the defendant declined to 
plead guilty to a charge carrying a ten-year maximum.21  More recently, the 
sentencing guidelines in effect invite prosecutors to use this tactic – to tell 
defendants, “take this offer or I will use every resource at the government’s 
disposal to deprive you of your liberty for as long as possible.”22  In effect, 
prosecutors have been given a green light to browbeat defendants who have 
the courage to reject an offer by suggesting that the price of refusal is even 
more criminal liability.  It is hard to view this tactic as anything less than 
official vindictiveness. 
Brady and Bordenkircher both contain language suggesting limits to 
what prosecutors can do in trying to get defendants to accept a bargain.  
Brady comments that neither the prosecutor nor the judge “deliberately [em-
ployed] their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant 
to tender a plea.”23  Brady adds that the prosecutor cannot induce a plea by 
“threats” or “promises to discontinue improper harassment,” or “misrepresen-
tation” (like “unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises”) or “promises that are by 
their nature improper,” such as inviting “bribes” in exchange for dropping or 
reducing charges.24  Bordenkircher also offers some limiting language.  The 
Court noted that the prosecutor did not bring “an additional and more serious 
charge” without notice after negotiations “relating only to the original in-
dictment,” implying that new charges brought by surprise might constitute an 
improper tactic.25 
Still, Bordenkircher is justifiably viewed as an abomination.  The reason 
is not that “charge bargaining” (as it is called) should be barred completely 
but that upping the punishment from ten years to life cannot be “justified 
even remotely,” as Professor Albert Alschuler said, as a proportional re-
sponse to a refusal to save the State the cost of going to trial.26  How to deal 
 
 20. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751–52, 751 n.8 (1970) (commenting 
that there is no indication that judge or prosecutor “deliberately employ their charging 
and sentencing powers” to persuade defendant to plead). 
 21. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358–59, 365 (1978) (5–4 decision). 
 22. United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002) (discussed more fully at text following note 198, infra); see also U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2 cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) 
(contemplating “dismissal of charges or agreement not to pursue potential charges” if 
defendant enters and court accepts plea agreement). 
 23. Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 n.8. 
 24. Id. at 755 (citing Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1957), rev’d on other grounds, Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per 
curiam)). 
 25. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 360. 
 26. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. 
REV. 652, 680–81 (1981). 
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with such an abuse has attracted attention, but countermeasures bring difficul-
ties of their own: Absolutely prohibiting charge bargaining would encourage 
prosecutors to maximize charges at the outset, and scrutinizing prosecutorial 
motives seems impractical.  More plausible are measures like examining sen-
tences for fairness in light of the underlying facts and trying to define some 
outer limit on permissible degree of escalation, but there is little indication 
that courts are exercising such supervision.27  Such measures would enshrine 
in Criminal Rule 11 a requirement that the court examine the bargaining pro-
cess itself and the facts underlying the plea.  In order to make such an exami-
nation plausible, the Rule would have to provide that the prosecutor cannot, 
in the event the proposed deal is found to be unfair, pile on additional charges 
or seek higher penalties than those suggested in the deal. 
Mezzanatto’s reference to the voluntariness standard can be labeled the 
“Mezzanatto proviso,” and there are two important points to bear in mind: 
One is that we are closer here to dictum than to holding because the parties 
did not enter a plea agreement, and Mezzanatto did not argue that his waiver 
was coerced or unknowing.28  Second and perhaps more important, this pro-
viso is in the nature of an anchor to windward – a worst case scenario in 
which judicial intervention is required.  Thus it should not be understood as 
describing the only situation in which Mezzanatto waivers should be rendered 
inoperative.  In the end, then, Mezzanatto says that a defendant is stuck with 
the statements he makes in trying to bargain a plea (at least to the extent that 
he changes his position in testimony at trial), but there is a small “out.”  A 
defendant is not stuck with his statements if they are adduced in a bargaining 
process that becomes so coercive that the proposed plea is involuntary.29  
Moreover, this proviso is in the nature of dictum, which suggests there may 
be other concerns that would also free defendants from this consequence, and 
these might include changes of heart due to new developments in the eviden-
tiary picture or new advice from a lawyer. 
It is likely that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to withdraw 
from a plea agreement before entering a plea that the court accepts,30 alt-
hough it is not clear whether he can withdraw a plea after the court indicates 
its acceptance but before sentencing the defendant in the manner contemplat-
ed by the plea agreement.  Courts, moreover, have broad authority to reject 
pleas or plea agreements on fairness grounds and can do so for reasons that 
would not come even close to a finding of involuntariness in the constitution-
al sense.  Under Criminal Rule 11, a court can allow a defendant to withdraw 
a guilty plea for any “fair and just reason.”31  Indeed, there are many circum-
 
 27. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.2(b) (4th ed. 2015) 
(describing these approaches and finding problems with each). 
 28. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). 
 29. See id. at 210. 
 30. United States v. Alvarez-Tautimez, 160 F.3d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1998) (not 
reaching question whether defense counsel was deficient because defendant had “the 
absolute right to withdraw his plea before it was accepted” by the court). 
 31. FED R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). 
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stances that differ from Mezzanatto in material ways that cast doubt on the 
wisdom of enforcing waivers.  This Article develops reasons why waivers 
should not be enforced.  Some of these reasons conflict with the views of the 
majority in Mezzanatto, and the arguments developed in this Article suggest 
that Mezzanatto was wrongly decided.  But even with Mezzanatto in place, 
there is room for these views to operate and for courts to render waivers in-
operative. 
B.  Plea Bargaining Waivers Expand 
Our plea bargaining system can operate only if defendants waive im-
portant rights.  (The Mezzanatto majority was right on this point.32)  Criminal 
Rule 11 has long required the judge to tell a defendant that he has the right to 
plead not guilty, to have a jury trial, to have legal representation, to call wit-
nesses on his behalf, to confront and cross-examine witnesses called by the 
prosecutor, to testify, and to be protected against self-incrimination.33  The 
judge is to ensure that in entering his plea the defendant understands that he is 
waiving these rights.  And, since an amendment adopted in 1999, the court is 
specifically to ensure that the defendant understands that his waiver affects 
his right “to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.”34 
The Mezzanatto majority referred to many of these waivable rights (jury 
trial, confrontation, protection against self-incrimination), by way of support-
ing its conclusion that the defendant can also waive his right to exclude what 
he says during plea bargaining.  The dissenting Justices understood this point 
as well, but they thought that adding another right to the list of waivable ones 
would lead to still more extensive waivers.  Indeed it has: Courts enforce 
waivers of the right to obtain records of investigation, the right to exclude 
documents, the right to discovery, as well as waivers authorizing prosecutors 
to use evidence unearthed on account of plea bargaining statements (so-called 
derivative use of those statements).35  Until 2010, the Justice Department 
 
 32. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 209–10 (plea bargaining process “necessarily 
exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of fundamental 
rights”). 
 33. FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(E). 
 34. FED R. CRIM P. 11(b)(1)(N); see also State v. Makinson, 665 P.2d 1376, 
1377 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (McInturff, J., dissenting) (describing waivers). 
 35. United States v. Seleznev, No. CR 11-70 RAJ, 2016 WL 1720762, at *1 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 2016) (derivative use waiver); Robinson v. DEA, No. 
1:15CV251-HSO-JCG, 2016 WL 1448858, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 12, 2016) (waiver 
of right to records of investigation); United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421, 425 (3d Cir. 
2015) (collateral attack waiver); Wosotowsky v. United States, Nos. 13–1613 & 
2:11–203, 2014 WL 1572413, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2014) (waiver of right seek to 
vacate sentence); United States v. Morris, No. 12-253, 2013 WL 6185165, at *1 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2013) (waiver allowing hearsay report and covering “documents 
or physical or electronic evidence furnished by [Defendant]” (alteration in original)); 
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asked defendants to waive their right to seek post-conviction DNA testing 
under the Innocence Protection Act, but in the same year the Attorney Gen-
eral reversed that policy.36 
Among the more controversial are waivers of the right to appeal.  In 
Vanderwerff, a 2012 Colorado case, Judge Kane had had enough.  Complain-
ing that plea bargaining has led to “the pandemic waiver” of important rights 
making trial by jury “an inconvenient artifact,” and that “the push is to rele-
gate [judges] to approving or disapproving” bargains, he refused to accept a 
plea bargain because it included a waiver of the right to appeal.37  He was 
reversed,38 however, and authoritative decisions uphold such waivers.39  Oth-
er judges have expressed similar doubts as Judge Kane, and they occasionally 
balk at what seem to be overbroad waivers.  Whether the right to receive ex-
culpatory evidence can be waived is a matter still in doubt.40 
In its 2012 decisions in Frye and Lafler,41 the Supreme Court extended 
modest constitutional protections against inadequate legal representation dur-
ing plea bargaining.  Not surprisingly, prosecutors reacted by asking defend-
ants to sign advance waivers relinquishing these rights too.  So, for every new 
right we get a new waiver; is that what we should be doing?  Whack-A-Mole, 
anyone?  Again, we see signs that courts have had enough.  In 2014, the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky ruled that federal prosecutors cannot ethically ask 
defense lawyers to approve such waivers,42 and state legal ethics authorities 
elsewhere have reached similar conclusions.43 
 
Porter v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 382, 388 (Ky. 2011) (waiver of right to dis-
covery, including name of informant). 
 36. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to 
All Federal Prosecutors, Guidance Regarding Use of DNA Waivers in Plea Agree-
ments (Nov. 19, 2010), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2010/11/19/ag-
memo-dna-waivers111810.pdf. 
 37. United States v. Vanderwerff, No. 12–cr–00069, 2012 WL 2514933, at *4– 
*5 (D. Colo. June 28, 2012) (appellate waivers undermine ability “to ensure the con-
stitutional validity of convictions and to maintain consistency and reasonableness in 
sentencing”), rev’d, 788 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 38. United States v. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2015).  
 39. See Fazio, 795 F.3d at 421; United States v. Grimes, 739 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
 40. See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragma-
tist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2060–
85 (2000) (arguing that contract law, constitutional law, and property law make such 
waivers void); Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 949, 956–63 (2008) (reporting practice of prosecutors in seeking waivers of 
right of disclosure for evidence or information that negates guilt or mitigates offense 
and arguing for ethical duty to make such disclosure during bargaining). 
 41. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) and Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 
(2012) are described further at notes 141–46, infra. 
 42. United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 156–57 (Ky. 2014). 
 43. See Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Crimi-
nal Justice System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
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III.  DIFFERENT ROADS, SAME DESTINATION: THE WAIVER IN 
OPERATION  
A.  Beginning Point – The Parties Talk 
In one sense, the proffer session in Mezzanatto was typical.  Early in the 
game, shortly after the defendant’s apprehension, the two sides meet and talk.  
The prosecutor wants to find out what the defendant knows and can testify to, 
and the defense wants to find out what the prosecutor is thinking and what 
evidence she has.  Images from the TV series Law and Order, now looping 
endlessly on cable channels, are fictional: There, prosecutor Jack McCoy 
could expect Chief Detective Anita Van Buren to send out Lennie Briscoe 
and Ed Green to interview witnesses and gather statements.44  In reality, little 
investigation goes forward apart from initial police reports, and the proffer 
session is a discovery mechanism.45  For the defense, the session also pro-
vides clues about the attitude of the prosecutor and hints about possible 
charges.  For prosecutors, often the main question is whether the defendant 
can be useful in other cases and whether his own culpability is of such a na-
ture that a deal would be palatable if the matter catches the public eye. 
In another sense, the proffer session in Mezzanatto was not typical be-
cause it was broken off early and did not lead to serious plea discussions.  In 
contrast to Mezzanatto, serious plea bargaining usually follows proffer ses-
sions.  Indeed, the parties sometimes go straight to bargaining because it is 
clear to all from the beginning that the defendant has nothing to offer that will 
aid in prosecuting others, and what is left is a possible deal on some charge.  
Sometimes everything happens in one meeting; sometimes there are more 
 
73 (2014) (arguing that courts should refuse to enforce such waivers); Peter A. Joy & 
Rodney J. Uphoff, Systemic Barriers to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bar-
gaining, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2103, 2124 (2014) (showing that ethics boards in ten states 
have reached this conclusion); Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains That Waive Claims of 
Ineffective Assistance – Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647, 668–69 
(2013) (arguing that courts should not enforce such waivers); see also 28 U.S.C. § 
530B(a) (2012) (government attorneys are subject to state laws and rules governing 
attorneys). 
 44. Law and Order starred Sam Waterson (“Jack McCoy”), S. Epatha Merkerson 
(“Anita Van Buren”), Jerry Orbach (“Lennie Briscoe”), and Jesse L. Martin (“Ed 
Green”).  The series ran for twenty years (1990–2010) and is still omnipresent as 
reruns on cable channels in many different iterations.  Law and Order, IMDb, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0098844/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
 45. See Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Respon-
sibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 553–558 (1999); 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, at §21.3(c) (stating that in plea bargaining, prosecutors 
provide the amount of discovery that they are constitutionally required to permit).  
But see United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (noting that the plea agree-
ment may waive right to receive information relating to affirmative defense). 
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meetings.  Almost always, however, both sides are thinking about a deal from 
the very beginning. 
Because of the connection and overlap of proffer sessions and plea bar-
gaining, it is actually hard to tell them apart.  Since Rule 410 speaks of state-
ments by the defendant “during plea discussions,” it would be at least some-
what plausible to take the view that “proffer sessions” are not covered.  But 
courts are realistic in applying Rule 410 to both proffer and plea bargaining 
sessions, since the possibility of a deal is always on the minds of the negotiat-
ing parties, and a real line between one and the other kind of conversation 
cannot be reliably drawn.46  In Mezzanatto, no one argued that Rule 410 did 
not apply to the conversation between the two sides, even though the conver-
sation had not reached the point of actually talking about a plea bargain, and 
the two sides were in the initial phases of what might have led to a proffer 
and/or a bargain.47  And no one argued that Rule 410 does not reach plea 
allocutions made when the defendant explains his guilty plea to the judge – 
these too would be excludable under the Rule unless the waiver were en-
forced.48 
As suggested in the opening pages of this Article, the defendant is ex-
pected to talk in person during these sessions (proffer and plea bargaining), 
and law enforcement agents in attendance know at least some of the facts, 
whether from surveillance activities, personal observation, or talks with oth-
ers.  Hence they may know whether the defendant is telling the truth and 
whether he is leaving things out. 
Where the focus is on whether and how the defendant could help con-
vict others, the prosecutor requires a Mezzanatto waiver at the outset – an 
advance waiver that covers whatever the defendant says thereafter in the con-
versation or in ensuing conversations.49  Waiver in hand, the prosecutor 
stresses the importance of being truthful and warns that what the defendant 
says can be used at a later trial.  The waiver is part of the “price of talking,” 
and the defendant pays the price before he knows where the conversation is 
going or what might emerge in it.  As Mezzanatto argued before the Supreme 
Court, “[T]he government’s agreement here did not obligate the government 
to perform on any promise, nor did it impose any duty upon the govern-
 
 46. United States v. Ross, 588 F. Supp. 2d 777, 783, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(absent proffer letter with waiver, defendant’s statements were not admissible and 
stating, “[I]f a line can be drawn between [proffer meetings and plea bargaining], it is 
not bold enough to withstand Rule 410’s effect”); United States v. Stein CR. 04-269-
9, 2005 WL 1377851, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2005) (finding proffer sessions gave rise 
to “statements made in the course of plea discussions” under Rule 410). 
 47. See Brief for the United States at 10–11, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 
U.S. 196 (1995) (No. 93-1340). 
 48. See SEC v. Payton, 176 F. Supp. 3d 346, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 49. United States v. Sitzmann, 853 F. Supp. 2d 127, 132 & n.5 (D.D.C. Cir. 
2012) (“debriefing agreement” waived objection to use of statements given then or 
later). 
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ment.”50  But for any defendant, the situation is coercive and fraught with 
risk.  Usually he concedes, as he must if he hopes for a deal, facts suggesting 
guilt of an offense, and each concession increases the pressure on him to 
make a deal.  The waiver paves the way to use everything he says and sub-
jects him to an almost certain conviction of something. 
If the conversation turns explicitly to bargaining, and the defendant has 
not yet waived his rights under Rule 410, a waiver is sometimes folded into 
the plea agreement itself.  A waiver that is part of the agreement can cover 
statements made in the conversation leading up to the agreement (and later 
conversations too) and also factual stipulations set forth in the agreement 
itself.51  After the conversations that produce a Mezzanatto waiver, the course 
of events varies.  The one near-constant element is the waiver, which in a way 
dominates the picture because it is almost always given effect in any later 
trial. 
B.  End Point – No Deal, As Negotiations Fail 
Sometimes proffer or bargaining sessions end without agreement, as in 
Mezzanatto itself.  One might think that where the conversation is unproduc-
tive, the parties would return to their prior condition – no harm, no foul, so to 
speak.  But the waiver gets separated from failed conversations, treated as a 
binding contract, and enforced by courts.  What would otherwise be excluda-
ble under Rule 410 as statements “made during plea discussions with an at-
torney for the prosecuting authority” that “did not result in a guilty plea” are 
admitted in a later trial, sometimes only to impeach the defendant’s testimo-
ny,52 sometimes to rebut defense evidence,53 and often as substantive evi-
dence during the prosecutor’s case-in-chief.54 
 
 50. Brief for Respondent at 31, Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (No. 93-1340). 
 51. United States v. Washburn, 728 F.3d 775, 779–82 (8th Cir. 2013) (plea 
agreement waived right to exclude stipulation of facts after defendant declined to 
enter plea); United States v. Stevens, No. 2:09–cr–00222–11, 2010 WL 5343189, at 
*3 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 21, 2010) (admitting stipulation of facts in plea agreement; can 
be used in government’s case-in-chief). 
 52. FRE 410(a)(4); Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 198 (prosecutor told defendant at 
“the beginning” that he “would have to agree that any statements he made . . .  could 
be used to impeach any contradictory testimony he might give”). 
 53. See United States v. Shannon, 803 F.3d 778, 783–85 (6th Cir. 2015) (proffer 
could refute testimony defendant adduced from government witness); United States v. 
Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2011) (proffer could rebut facts “implied by doc-
umentary evidence”); United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(proffer could “rebut contra[dictory] evidence or arguments”). 
 54. United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 288–89 (5th Cir. 2009) (allowing 
use of proffer statements in government’s case-in-chief); United States v. Hardwick, 
544 F.3d 565, 569–70 (3d Cir. 2008) (enforcing waiver in proffer agreement allowing 
use of defendant’s statements in government’s case-in-chief); United States v. Bloate, 
534 F.3d 893, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2008) (waiver reached proffer statements), rev’d on 
other grounds, Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010). 
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C.  End Point – Deal Reached; One Party or Another Withdraws 
It happens with some frequency that the parties enter into a plea agree-
ment but one side or the other backs out.  Often it is the defendant who does 
so, deciding that it is better to renege on the deal than to go forward, breach-
ing the agreement and insisting on trial.  Behind such a decision may be any 
number of reasons.  Sometimes the defendant finds a new lawyer because he 
thinks his assigned counsel is not motivated enough, or is too insistent in 
urging a plea to avoid trial.  Particularly in offices of public defenders, case-
loads are often so heavy that lawyers feel that they must dispose quickly of 
many of their cases because they simply lack resources to mount any real 
defense.55  Sometimes the defendant finds a lawyer who takes a different 
view of the case, and sometimes evidence comes to light that improves the 
chance of acquittal.56  Sometimes there is no articulated reason – just a 
change of mind.57 
Even before Mezzanatto, courts sometimes admitted the defendant’s 
bargaining statements in this setting,58 and modern decisions usually enforce 
 
 55. Anderson Cooper, Inside NOLA Public Defenders’ Decision to Refuse Felo-
ny Cases, CBS NEWS (Apr. 16, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-new-
orleans-public-defenders-decision-to-refuse-felony-cases/ (Derwyn Bunton, chief 
public defender in New Orleans, stated that he has a fifty-two-lawyer staff handling 
more than 20,000 defendants and that in those conditions “you can’t provide the kind 
of representation that the Constitution, our code of ethics and professional standards” 
require.). 
 56. United States v. Brooks, CR 14-382 (RMB), 2015 WL 6509016, at *2–3 
(D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2015) (defendant did not understand he was waiving rights to block 
use of statements to rebut evidence he might offer; waiver unenforceable); United 
States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504, 513, 517 (5th Cir. 2013) (when defendant changed 
lawyers and decided not to plead guilty, waiver was enforceable); United States v. 
Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 184–85 (1st Cir. 2007) (when defendant withdrew plea on 
basis of “post-plea” evidence supporting innocence, waiver unenforceable); Sylvester, 
583 F.3d at 287–88 (when defendant hired a new lawyer and decided to go to trial, 
waiver was enforceable). 
 57. United States v. Washburn, 728 F.3d 775, 780–82 (8th Cir. 2013) (no reason 
given for refusal to plead as agreed; waiver enforceable); Quiroga v. United States, 
Nos. C 10–3019–MWB & CR 06–3009–MWB, 2011 WL 2118811, at *1, *10–11 
(N.D. Iowa May 25, 2011) (defendant moved to withdraw plea, expressing “belated 
misgivings” but without making claim of innocence; waiver enforceable); United 
States v. Stevens, No. 2:09–cr–00222–11, 2010 WL 5343189, at *1, *3 (S.D.W. Va. 
Dec. 21, 2010) (when defendant declined to plead, stipulation in plea agreement was 
usable in government’s case-in-chief). 
 58. United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 730–31 (2d Cir. 1978) (court admit-
ted statements to grand jury under plea agreement that defendant abrogated; trial court 
said he “lost the protection of the plea agreement” when he didn’t plead; reviewing 
court doubted Rule 410 applies to grand jury testimony after plea agreement). 
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waivers.59  A few cases, however, conclude that a defendant who justifiably 
withdraws from a plea agreement is not in breach and that the waiver does 
not take effect.60  Judges occasionally remark that the defendant deserves 
flexibility in making what, for him, is a momentous decision with huge life-
altering consequences.61 
Sometimes the prosecutor withdraws.  Typically she explains that the 
defendant engaged in misconduct after signing the agreement, usually lying 
or withholding evidence that he agreed to provide.62  Here courts generally 
enforce waivers,63 although some decisions conclude that prosecutors who 
fail to perform their duties under a plea agreement lose their right to enforce 
those waivers.64 
Recall now the Mezzanatto proviso, under which a waiver is invalid if 
the plea itself is constitutionally unknowing or involuntary.65  It follows that a 
waiver is invalid if it is part of a plea agreement that is itself “unknowing or 
involuntary.”66  Again it is important to note that the Mezzanatto proviso is 
not a holding – it should not be read to mean that only such factors render a 
waiver inoperative.  Importantly, we can also see in this circumstance – in 
which one party or another withdraws from an agreement – a situation that 
 
 59. United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 806–07 (10th Cir. 2015) (when the judge 
let the defendant withdraw the plea because the defendant still thought he would have 
a trial on guilt or innocence, the court correctly enforced Mezzanatto waiver). 
 60. Newbert, 504 F.3d at 183 (defendant withdrew plea on basis of “new plausi-
ble evidence of innocence”; not in violation). 
 61. E.g., id. at 185 (there should be some “protection for defendants from pleas 
gone awry” to encourage “openness and honesty during plea negotiations”); United 
States v. Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1022,1029–30 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (wishing that 8th 
Circuit would “relax the showing required to overcome the purported voluntariness of 
a waiver of Rule 410 rights in a plea agreement, or narrow the circumstances in which 
such a waiver is enforceable” because consequences on defendant who “balks” at plea 
for legitimate reasons are “unduly harsh”), aff’d, 674 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 62. See Pitt v. State, 832 A.2d 267, 277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (state with-
drew on ground that defendant was withholding evidence and giving false testimony; 
in rescinding, state “gave up all rights to use [defendant’s] statements at trial,” regard-
less whether he breached and regardless whether state was justified). 
 63. See, e.g., State v. Willis, 700 S.E.2d 266, 267, 269 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (per 
curiam) (defendant signed waiver and entered plea discussions leading to lie detector 
test that he failed; prosecutor broke off negotiations; case went to trial; waiver en-
forceable). 
 64. Pitt, 832 A.2d at 277 (when state rescinded plea agreement, statements ob-
tained under it lost voluntary status and became inadmissible); United States v. Esca-
milla, 975 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1992) (defendant failed lie detector test; govern-
ment voided agreement to “restore the status quo ante” but introducing confession 
gave government benefits of bargain while denying them to defendant) (reversing). 
 65. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995). 
 66. United States v. Morrison, 515 F. Supp. 2d 340, 350–52 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(proffer agreement “was largely driven by [defendant’s] belief, created by the detec-
tives’ comments, that, as a practical matter, he had no choice”) (agreement unen-
forceable; waiver invalid). 
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should be governed by a principle that we can usefully call the “unitary prin-
ciple.”  Under this principle, the plea, the plea agreement, and the Mezzanatto 
waiver succeed or fail together.  In its fullest expression, this principle holds 
that they are of a piece, connected parts of one transaction, and if any part of 
the arrangement fails, the whole transaction is set aside.  The principle finds 
expression in the Kercheval case in 1927, as we will see, and finds expression 
in modern cases as well.67 
D.  End Point – Deal Reached, but Court Rejects It 
Plea agreements are subject to court approval.68  If the court does not 
approve and the parties cannot work out something different and persuade the 
court to accept another deal, the waiver question can arise during trial.  Usu-
ally the waiver is not by its terms contingent on judicial acceptance of a plea, 
and courts enforce it as written.69  Occasionally the language does make an 
agreement contingent on judicial acceptance of a plea, and rejection of the 
plea means the waiver is inoperative too.70 
Under the Mezzanatto proviso, a waiver is invalid if the plea or agree-
ment is constitutionally unknowing or involuntary, as later decisions recog-
nize.71  This proviso does not address, and does not cover, the full range of 
situations in which a court might refuse to accept a plea: A court can reject a 
proposed plea because it lacks a factual basis, because the proposed sentence 
(or range of sentences) does not comport with the Sentencing Guidelines, and 
for other reasons as well.72  Since the Mezzanatto proviso does not purport to 
exhaust the situations where a waiver should fail, here too a court has room to 
hold a waiver inoperative in the event of a later trial, and the unitary principle 
 
 67. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927) (discussed further at 
text accompanying notes 231–33, infra). 
 68. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 69. See State v. Bennett, 370 S.E.2d 120, 126 (W. Va. 1988). 
 70. See United States v. Escobedo, 757 F.3d 229, 232–34 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(agreement was ambiguous on question whether defendant waived rights “contempo-
raneously with his signing” or only on “acceptance and activation” of plea; defense 
could withdraw plea before it was accepted, which did not waive right to exclude his 
statements); United States v. Kowalewski, No. 2:13–CR–00045–RWS, 2014 WL 
6667127, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2014) (magistrate judge recommends granting 
motion to suppress statements made in the course of plea agreement due to ambigu-
ous nature of waiver provision). 
 71. See United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d 55, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2003) (after 
rejecting plea, court should not have admitted defendant’s statements; he was “de-
prived of the benefit” of his bargain); Alesi v. Craven, 440 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 
1971) (when plea was withdrawn as involuntary, statements are inadmissible, even to 
impeach; plea and statements are “inextricably intertwined”). 
 72. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, at §§ 21.1(h), 21.4(f). 
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indicates that indeed the plea, agreement, and waiver ought to succeed or fail 
together.73 
E.  End Point – Defendant Enters Plea, but Withdraws It 
A defendant who enters a plea under a bargain may withdraw it with the 
court’s permission.  As noted above, the Rule says the court may permit a 
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for any “fair and just reason.”74  Not sur-
prisingly, a defendant may entertain second thoughts about a plea for much 
the same reasons that he regrets entering into an agreement in the first place: 
He may think his lawyer did not put forth enough effort or pushed him too 
hard to make a deal, or he may think new evidence will turn the case around.  
In this setting, the system indulges the defendant at least to the extent of let-
ting him withdraw the plea, and Kercheval remains strong on the point that 
the withdrawn plea is not admissible.  There, the Court said a withdrawn plea 
has “ceased to be evidence,” and allowing its use against a defendant who 
goes to trial would put him in “a dilemma utterly inconsistent” with the deci-
sion allowing withdrawal of the plea.75 
This small indulgence, however, is largely nullified by the fact that 
courts usually enforce Mezzanatto waivers by admitting the defendant’s bar-
gaining statements in the ensuing trial.76  This practice violates the unitary 
principle, which would exclude the underlying statements whenever the plea 
is excluded.  Some courts still limit their use to impeachment, meaning that 
they are admissible only if the defendant testifies and says something incon-
sistent with what he said before.77  Most modern courts now admit them as 
 
 73. See the discussion at notes 194–99, infra. 
 74. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United States v. Yazzie, No. CR 10–1761 JB, 
2014 WL 1946880, at *10 (D.N.M. May 6, 2014) (courts have broad discretion; deci-
sion should turn on whether (a) defendant asserts innocence, (b) the government 
would suffer prejudice, (c) defendant delayed, (d) withdrawal would inconvenience 
the court, (e) defendant had “close assistance” of counsel, (f) the plea was knowing 
and voluntary, and (g) withdrawal would waste judicial resources) (likelihood of 
conviction also counts). 
 75. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927) (discussed in more 
detail in text accompanying notes 231–33, infra). 
 76. United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 806–11 (10th Cir. 2015) (when defendant 
withdrew plea but failed to show at trial plea and agreement were “unknowing or 
involuntary,” waiver was enforceable); United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 1002, 
1005 (10th Cir. 2011) (enforcing waiver and admitting plea bargaining statements in 
government’s case-in-chief; plea was voluntary; court allowed withdrawal because of 
undue influence by counsel); United States v. Quiroga, 554 F.3d 1150, 1155–57 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (defendant withdrew plea because lawyer wrongly told him he could not be 
sentenced as career offender; defendant argued that allowing him to withdraw was 
inconsistent with ruling admitting statements; court replied that “we are not bound to 
reconcile the district court’s orders,” noting that order allowing defendant to withdraw 
his plea was not appealable). 
 77. See People v. Crow, 28 Cal. App. 4th 440, 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
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substantive evidence, so they can be offered during the prosecutor’s case-in-
chief and can be used to counter evidence of any sort offered by the defense 
or suggestions arising in defense arguments for acquittal.78  Before Mezzanat-
to waivers became commonplace, such statements were usually excludable.79 
In rare instances, modern courts reject waivers in this setting on the 
ground that the facts of the case before them introduce concerns that were not 
present in Mezzanatto.80  In the Newbert case, for example, Judge Woodcock 
of the United States District Court for the District of Maine allowed the de-
fendant to withdraw a plea on the ground that new information had come into 
the defendant’s possession that “significantly affected” his assessment of the 
government’s case against him.81  And the judge went further in recognizing 
and sympathizing with the dilemma of defendants who have entered guilty 
pleas: 
 
Once the plea agreement has been signed and the guilty plea ac-
cepted, it is “human nature for defendants to wonder what would have 
happened if they had put the Government to its proof and later to rue 
their decisions to plead guilty.”  United States v. Leland, 370 F. Supp. 
2d 337, 343 (D. Me. 2005).  But, not all motions are created equal.  
Some, even though successful, may reflect the court’s reluctance to 
sentence someone who insists he is innocent, albeit belatedly.  See 
[United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315 at 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1998)] 
(“Implausible as Mr. Burch’s belated claim of innocence may seem, 
the Court will give Mr. Burch his day in court.”).  Others, such as this 
case, present at least a plausible claim of actual innocence from evi-
dence obtained after the guilty plea.  If the latter is the case, the de-
fendant cannot have breached the plea agreement by filing the motion 
to withdraw, since this new evidence would likely have substantially 
affected his decision to enter the plea agreement in the first place.  See 
United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1004 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Oc-
casionally, however, through no fault of either party, a reasonably un-
foreseeable event intervenes, destroying the basis of the contract and 
creating a situation where performance by one party will no longer 
 
 78. See United States v. Alazzam, No. 1:08CR101 (JCC), 2009 WL 3245392, at 
*4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2009) (granting government’s motion to introduce defendant’s 
signed statements in its case-in-chief after defendant withdrew plea); see also United 
States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321–22 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (court could “discern no 
reason not to uphold the trial judge’s ruling . . . that a defendant can waive his rights 
under [Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6)] and [FRE 410] to the extent of allowing statements 
made in the plea proceeding itself and in a subsequent debriefing to be used as part of 
the prosecution’s case-in-chief”). 
 79. See Mann v. State, 605 P.2d 209, 209–11 (Nev. 1980) (when defendant pled 
guilty but withdrew plea, plea bargaining statement could not be used to impeach). 
 80. E.g., State v. Pitt, 891 A. 2d 312, 322 (Md. 2006) (waiver was invalid where 
state repudiates, regardless of good faith belief that defendant breached plea agree-
ment). 
 81. United States v. Newbert, 477 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Me. 2007). 
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give the receiving party what induced him to enter into the contract in 
the first place.”).82 
 
Beyond advancing a “fair and just reason” to withdraw a plea, the de-
fendant is entitled to withdraw a plea if it was unknowing or involuntarily in 
the constitutional sense.83  The Mezzanatto proviso indicates that the waiver 
too is inoperative.84  Again we recall that the proviso is not a holding and 
should not be understood as listing all the factors that should make a waiver 
inoperative, and again we should recognize that the unitary principle, quite 
independently, suggests the waiver should not operate (agreement, plea, and 
waiver should succeed or fail together).85  The constitutional standard (“vol-
untary and knowing”) and the Rules standard (“fair and just reason”) seem to 
overlap, and prosecutorial pressures on defendants bear on proper application 
of both standards.86  A decision allowing the defendant to withdraw a plea on 
the basis of either standard can justify rendering the waiver inoperative as 
well.87 
IV.  MEZZANATTO WAIVERS SHOULD BE UNLAWFUL 
Mezzanatto waivers should be unlawful for four reasons.  First, they 
make the plea bargaining process even more unfair than it already is, and 
magnify its dysfunctionality (its worst externalities) for four reasons that are 
examined in detail in this section.  Second, these waivers produce untrustwor-
thy statements that should not be used to convict their maker.  Third, these 
waivers are invalid contracts, often unsupported by consideration and almost 
invariably unconscionable.  Fourth, these waivers undermine the congres-
sional purpose in enacting Rule 410 and violate its very terms. 
A.  They Make Plea Bargaining Unfair and Magnify Its Dysfunctional-
ity 
1.  Unfairness 
A policy objective of the criminal justice system should include fairness 
in the plea bargaining process, and that is the specific policy of Rule 410 as 
well.  Unfortunately Mezzanatto had the opposite effect, making the process 
 
 82. Id. at 291 (citing United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1004 (10th Cir. 
1998)). 
 83. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See the discussion at notes 194–99, infra. 
 86. United States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005) (involuntary, 
unintelligent, or uninformed pleas are invalid; “invalidity qualifies as a ‘fair and just 
reason’ for permitting withdrawal”). 
 87. See United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627–28 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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less fair and undermining the specific purpose of Rule 410.  Mezzanatto con-
sidered this policy objective but adopted an unrealistic view of plea bargain-
ing that turned on its head the congressional rationale for enacting Rule 410.  
As the Court saw it, prosecutors may be unwilling to engage in plea bargain-
ing unless they can get defendants to waive the right to exclude what they 
thereafter say.  With this starting point, and this prosecutorial perspective, the 
Court reasoned as follows: Without a waiver, prosecutors might “decline to 
enter into cooperation discussions in the first place.”  And enforcing a waiver 
will encourage defendants to enter into plea bargaining: “A defendant can 
‘maximize’ what he has to ‘sell’ only if he is permitted to offer what the 
prosecutor is most interested in buying.”  So enforcing waivers will not 
“bring plea bargaining to a grinding halt,” and “may well have the opposite 
effect.”88  In sum, it is better to enforce a waiver – or to put it the other way 
around, better to refuse to enforce the exclusionary doctrine in Rule 410 – in 
order to encourage bargaining. 
Those comments are unrealistic because they wrongly suppose the par-
ties have some actual choice in the matter of bargaining and that sometimes 
bargaining is a good bet and sometimes refusing to bargain is the better 
choice.  In fact, however, neither side can afford not to bargain.  On the side 
of the prosecution and the system, there are not enough resources to bring to 
trial, or for courts to conduct trials, in anything more than a tiny fraction of 
cases.  And quite apart from the adequacy of resources, plea bargaining 
serves the interests of both prosecutors and courts: Prosecutors get the benefit 
of high conviction rates with less expenditure of time and little risk of rever-
sal, and courts get an important tool that helps keep their dockets moving, 
again with little risk of reversal.  On the defense side, there is a similar re-
source problem because public defenders cannot try more than a tiny fraction 
of the cases to which they are assigned.89  O.J. Simpson, Kobe Bryant, and 
“Skinny Joey” Merlino may be able to afford good defense lawyers, but the 
vast majority of persons charged with crimes cannot.90  Defendants have an-
 
 88. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 207–209. 
 89. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 208, 212–13 (2003) (explaining that “a bargain saves time 
for both the judge and the prosecutor” and that early analysis and drafters of Sentenc-
ing Guidelines wrongly thought judges would reduce plea bargaining). 
 90. Famously, O.J. Simpson hired Robert Shapiro initially, and later Johnnie 
Cochran (who died in 2005), F. Lee Bailey, Alan Dershowitz, and Robert Kardashian, 
ultimately winning acquittal on all charges.  See ABC News, O.J. Simpson Trial: 
Where Are They Now?, ABC NEWS (June 12, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/oj-
simpsontrial-now/story?id=17377772.  Kobe Bryant retained the Denver firm of Had-
don Morgan Foreman.  That firm’s Pamela Mackey became his lawyer and got the 
case dismissed.  See Pamela Robillard Mackey, HADDON MORGAN FOREMAN, 
http://www.hmflaw.com/attorney-pamela-robillard-mackey.html (last visited Dec. 27, 
2017); Kirk Johnson, Prosecutors Drop Kobe Bryant Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/02/us/prosecutors-drop-kobe-bryant-rape-
case.html?mcubz=3.  In August 2016, police arrested reputed Philadelphia mob boss 
Joey Merlino for alleged racketeering.  In the past, Merlino has been represented by 
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other motivation to bargain –  the threat of serious charges for even relatively 
minor offenses, a point to which we shall return. 
For these reasons, supposing that the amount of plea bargaining is re-
sponsive to a rule that either admits or excludes what the defendant says is 
like supposing that the number of people who will buy groceries turns on 
whether a store is located within ten blocks of where they live.  It would be a 
gross misunderstanding to attribute to Mezzanatto the fact that the practice of 
plea bargaining has grown in the closing decades of the twentieth century.91  
The decision itself did not require courts to use waivers to justify the substan-
tive use of statements by defendants – indeed five Justices went on record in 
opposition to this move.  And Mezzanatto did not foreclose the development 
of robust defenses to the enforcement of waivers, which this Article attempts 
to lay out.92  In short, the right way to understand Mezzanatto involves recog-
nizing that excluding or admitting the defendant’s statements has no impact 
on the rate of plea bargaining. 
So what does one make of the policy objective of Rule 410?  That Con-
gress was wrong to think that excluding statements would encourage plea 
bargaining?  No, Congress was not wrong, but looking for causal connections 
is not the point.  Saying Rule 410 seeks to encourage plea bargaining is 
shorthand for a larger idea: What we want, and where the exclusionary prin-
ciple in Rule 410 helps, is a plea bargaining process that is fair to both sides.  
Mezzanatto’s evisceration of Rule 410 has the opposite impact. 
Similar misconceived arguments swirl around privilege law.  John Hen-
ry Wigmore notoriously claimed that any benefit conferred by the attorney-
client privilege is “indirect and speculative” (its obstructive effects being 
“plain and concrete”),93 and Charles McCormick and others followed Wig-
more to this dead end.94  Of course persons with legal problems would still 
 
New Jersey lawyer Edwin Jacobs.  See David Gambacorta, Bada-Bing! Joey Merlino 
Arrested by Feds in Massive Mob Bust, PHILA. MAG. (Aug. 5, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.phillymag.com/news/2016/08/05/bada-bing-joey-merlino-indictment/. 
 91. In 1975 (when the Evidence Rules took effect in the federal system, quickly 
followed by state adoptions), guilty pleas accounted for at least 86% of criminal dis-
positions in state courts in selected urban centers.  See Pasqual A. DonVito, An Ex-
periment in the Use of Court Statistics, 56 JUDICATURE 56, 61–62 (1972) (presenting 
table indicating felony dispositions in state courts in twelve metropolitan areas, show-
ing a range of 53–97% guilty pleas in selected urban areas, with an average above 
78%).  The percentage is higher in federal courts today (closer to 97%), and plea 
bargaining in state systems has kept pace (about 94% today, with regional variation).  
See Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-
judges-after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html. 
 92. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204. 
 93. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
 94. EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (3rd ed. 1984); 
see also KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (6th ed. 2006) 
(privilege has only “marginal” impact on client behavior and is not adequately sup-
ported by reason). 
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talk to lawyers if the privilege were eliminated, but abolishing it would force 
a lawyer to feel bound as a matter of decency and conscience to advise her 
client that what he says might have to be disclosed.  This warning would be 
poisonous, casting a pall of mistrust over a relationship that is already diffi-
cult and that depends on the lawyer’s loyalty and zeal in protecting the cli-
ent’s interests.  Putting a lawyer in the position of being a witness against her 
client has, as Justice Jackson remarked in a related contest, a “demoralizing” 
impact on the profession and casts the lawyer in a role completely “out of 
professional character.”95  And as the late David Louisell remarked years 
later, it “pervert[s] the function of counseling.”96  In short, the purpose of the 
privilege is not to make sure that those who need lawyers will consult them 
but to protect a relationship that can only operate honorably and humanely if 
it is confidential. 
Much the same argument persists about the spousal confidences privi-
lege.  Why have it?  The usual answer is to protect and foster a relationship 
valued by society – the “best solace of human existence,” as it is called.97  
Does the privilege depend on the proposition that people would less likely 
marry if we did not protect their confidences?  Or that they would still marry 
but be less candid with one another?  Of course not.  But the privilege is im-
portant in a culture that values and protects privacy in one of life’s critical 
relationships.  As Professor Charles Black argued in attacking the 1975 pro-
posal by the Rules Advisory Committee virtually to eliminate the privilege, 
the result would be that a court could force disclosure of any fact, “however 
intimate, however private, however embarrassing,” and such a rule “could 
easily – even often – force any decent person – anybody any of us would 
want to associate with – either to lie or to go to jail.”  A rule cannot be a good 
one, he concluded, if it “compels the decent and honorable to evade or to 
disobey it.”98 
Mezzanatto’s approach to Rule 410 makes the same mistake as these 
approaches that disfavor privilege law, expressing purpose simplistically and 
missing the main point.  Plea bargaining continues, but under Mezzanatto as 
expanded by later decisions, it is more than ever a rigged game.  The defend-
ant who signs a proffer or advance waiver gives up a right with no assurance 
that he will benefit, and finds himself in two double binds.  First, to entertain 
hope of a deal he must incriminate himself, but doing so already assures con-
viction of something if no agreement is reached and brought to fruition.99  
 
 95. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516–17 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 96. David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion: Privileges in 
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 112 (1956) (compelling lawyer to testify 
against his client would be “perverting the function of counseling”). 
 97. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 221–23 (1839) (expounding on spousal tes-
timonial privilege). 
 98. Charles L. Black, Jr., Marital and Physician Privileges – A Reprint of a Let-
ter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 48 (1975). 
 99. See Adam Robison, Comment, Waiver of Plea Agreement Statements: A 
Glimmer of Hope to Limit Plea Statement Usage to Impeachment, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 
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Second, he must cover the points that may be relevant to some charge (but he 
may not know what charge) because leaving out anything exposes him to 
being accused of lying if he says something at trial that he could have said 
before, and yet trying to say everything incriminates him even further, broad-
ening the array of charges that the prosecutor could plausibly bring.  
 The situation cannot help but make defendants and defense counsel 
mistrustful of prosecutors.  It cannot help but make defendants mistrustful of 
their own lawyers, who find themselves obliged to urge their clients to partic-
ipate in this unsavory process.  And it cannot help but make defense lawyers 
at best uncomfortable at being backed into a position in which they must rec-
ommend entering pleas to charged crimes that their clients probably did not 
commit because the alternative is a risk that is simply too horrendous to con-
template.100 
And it gets worse.  Having encouraged or persuaded her client to engage 
in plea discussions that did not succeed – either no deal was reached, or 
someone withdrew from it, or the court did not accept it, or the defendant 
withdrew his plea – the defense lawyer must now try a case that she has al-
most no chance of winning, on account of having recommended or acqui-
esced in the strategy that failed.  Even if the waiver is narrow, and permits 
only the impeaching use of defendant’s plea bargaining statements if he testi-
fies (an unusual limit nowadays), it will be a very “iffy” tactical choice to put 
him on the stand.  It will be hard for him to back away from what he said 
before when he went overboard in hope of reaching a deal by incriminating 
himself.  It is worth remembering that the idea of “inconsistency” is deter-
mined by a loose and generous standard: If what was said before “might lead 
to any relevant conclusion different from any other relevant conclusion,” then 
it is inconsistent and can be admitted.101  If the waiver allows full use of plea 
bargaining statements as substantive evidence, or more limited substantive 
use of such statements to refute (contradict) other defense evidence, defense 
counsel is even more constrained.  All that remains in her arsenal are argu-
ments that the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on 
every element of the offense, because any argument suggesting “factual inno-
cence” triggers the waiver.102 
 
661, 683 (2005) (“[I]t behooves the defendant to make a sufficient offering in the 
form of incriminating evidence and cooperation information.”). 
 100. See Alice Woolley, Hard Questions and Innocent Clients: The Normative 
Framework of the Three Hardest Questions, and the Plea Bargaining Problem, 44 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1181–82 (2016) (describing a plea that is “substantively 
unjust” because the client is “factually or legally innocent,” but that the defense law-
yer must nevertheless recommend the plea “even if it means participating in an injus-
tice”). 
 101. United States v. Jasin, 215 F. Supp. 2d 552, 589–91 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting 
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
613.04[1] (2d ed. 2002)) (admitting proffer statements). 
 102. United States v. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d 213, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (striking 
blanket waiver, which “operates effectively as a waiver of trial,” leaving defense “few 
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Contrast for a moment the handling of failed negotiations on the civil 
side of the docket: Under Rule 408, statements made in this context are ex-
cludable from any later trial, and the parties are put in the status quo ante.  
Thus Rule 408 even blocks the impeaching use of statements made during 
civil settlement negotiations, and waivers of these protections are unheard 
of.103  In short, we provide far more protection to the process of resolving 
claims for money damages than we provide to the process of resolving crimi-
nal charges.  There is no real explanation for this difference, except that our 
system is biased in favor of aiding prosecutors in their efforts to punish crim-
inal offenders. 
2. Dysfunctionality 
Plea bargaining was initially forbidden and frowned upon, basically as a 
matter of principle (there can be no compromise with criminal misconduct or 
issues of guilt).104  But as George Fisher recounts in his wonderful modern 
study, plea bargaining came into its own in the early twentieth century in an 
environment of optimism that the process could achieve justice through com-
promise while saving society and both sides from the expenses and ineffi-
ciencies of trial.105  In the last fifty years the picture has again changed, and 
again plea bargaining is controversial.  This time objections reflect not so 
much matters of principle but a growing view that the process is seriously 
dysfunctional.  In this new understanding of plea bargaining, Mezzanatto 
waivers are the lynchpin in the most damaging externalities of the system – 
overcharging, over-convicting (and convicting the innocent), and overincar-
ceration. 
There is, of course, a countervailing and optimistic strain of thought in 
which plea bargaining is seen as a two-sided conversation in which each side 
has something to offer, and the outcome of negotiations can be a socially 
useful compromise.  The Mezzanatto majority took this view, describing plea 
bargaining as a matter of “cooperation” and saying that enforceable waivers 
help the defendant by enabling him to “‘maximize’ what he has to ‘sell’ only 
 
options” except “generally [to] attack the credibility” of government witnesses and 
make “general statement” that defendant is innocent; any “factual assertion that di-
rectly contradicts the proffer” makes defendant’s statements admissible); United 
States v. Ford, No. 04–0562 (JBS), 2005 WL 1129497, at *5–6 (D.N.J. May 11, 
2005) (explaining that, without triggering waiver, a defense can point out “gaps” in 
government proof, and argue that it “must prove its case, or has failed,” but “if factual 
innocence is implied” in questioning government witnesses or by “argument,” waiver 
is triggered). 
 103. FRE 408(a) (specifying that statements during settlement negotiations cannot 
be used as “prior inconsistent statement[s]” or “contradiction”). 
 104. FISHER, supra note 89, at 6–7. 
 105. Id. (stating that the “1920s and early 1930s[] marked the true age of plea 
bargaining’s discovery”). 
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if he is permitted to offer what the prosecutor is most interested in buying.”106  
Earlier decisions describe bargaining as conferring a “mutuality of ad-
vantage”107 in a process involving parties with presumptively equal bargain-
ing power.108  Some modern commentators appear to agree with this pic-
ture.109 
Most commentators are not so sanguine: Professors Alschuler and Ste-
phen Schulhofer, for example, would abolish plea bargaining altogether.  
Such critics see plea bargaining as a one-sided conversation where prosecu-
tors hold all the cards.110  The Court confronted arguments based on coercion 
in the 1970s and rejected them.  In the Brady case in 1970, for example, the 
Court said that a plea of guilty entered in fear that the trial would result in the 
death penalty was nonetheless a voluntary plea, noting in passing that the 
state “encourages pleas of guilty at every important step” and is limited only 
by the notion that it may not “produce a plea by actual or threatened physical 
harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”111  And in 
the Bordenkircher case in 1978, the Court approved a plea entered after the 
prosecutor told the defendant that if he did not plead to uttering a forged in-
strument (punishable by two to ten years), the prosecutor would indict him 
under the Habitual Criminal Act (subjecting him to a mandatory life sentence 
because of two prior convictions).  The Court asserted that there was no coer-
cion so long as the defendant is “free to accept or reject” the offer.112 
For Alschuler and his former colleague John Langbein, a critical point 
favoring abolition is that plea bargaining has replaced trials, which have be-
come so costly and complex that they are seldom possible: Our system, he 
argues, is “absurd both in the complexity of its trial processes and in the 
 
 106. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 206–08 (1995). 
 107. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (quoting Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (plea bargaining “flows from ‘the mutuality of ad-
vantage’ to defendants and prosecutors, each with . . . reasons for wanting to avoid 
trial” (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 752)). 
 108. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(referring to “the give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the 
prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power”); 
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362–63 (citing Parker, 397 U.S. at 809 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting)). 
 109. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining Is a Shadow Market, 51 DUQ. L. 
REV. 551, 552 (2013); Alexander Farsaad, The Use of Plea Statement Waivers in 
Pretrial Agreements, 217 MIL. L. REV. 141, 165 (2013) (arguing that waivers encour-
age trust, which encourages settlement); Rasmusen, supra note 2, at 1569 (arguing 
that waivers incentivize defendants to cooperate and increase reliability of infor-
mation provided). 
 110. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1979); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 
1979 (1992). 
 111. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750. 
 112. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358–59, 363, 365. 
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summary manner in which it avoids trial” through plea bargaining.113  Our 
jury system has become more democratic but less and less available to those 
who might benefit from it.114  In capital cases, the system is peculiarly awful, 
leading to executions, as Alschuler puts it, “not only for the crime of commit-
ting an aggravated murder but also for the crime of standing trial.”115  In his 
study of plea bargaining in Middlesex County in Massachusetts, Fisher found 
at least some support for the proposition advanced by Langbein and Alschuler 
that longer trials lead to more plea bargaining.116  Schulhofer comes at it from 
a slightly different perspective, arguing that the problem with plea bargaining 
has to do with agency costs in a system in which prosecutors are politically 
motivated to seek excessive punishments and defense lawyers are economi-
cally motivated to avoid trial.  He argues, on the basis of studies of felony 
cases in Philadelphia, that summary trials to judges could be implemented for 
all cases and would represent a significant improvement over the plea bar-
gaining system.117 
In a pathbreaking article, Professors Robert Scott and William Stuntz 
analyze plea bargaining as a special form of contract negotiation and advance 
the theory that this mechanism in its present form cannot succeed in setting 
the right penalty for the offense because the prosecutor does not know all the 
facts and cannot accurately appraise a claim of innocence.118  Scott and 
Stuntz propose three reforms: Mandatory minimum sentences should be abol-
ished; judges should be empowered to impose lower sentences (lesser penal-
ties) than the parties agreed to; judges should be blocked from imposing 
higher sentences (greater penalties) than the parties agreed to.  Scott and 
 
 113. Alschuler, supra note 110, at 40–42 (“the more formal and elaborate the trial 
process, the more likely it is that this process will be subverted through pressures for 
self-incrimination”); see also John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 
U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12 (1978) (“[W]e have moved from an adjudicatory to a conces-
sionary system.”); Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, A Hallowed American Right, Is 
Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-
served-behind-closed-doors.html  (showing that federal judges in New York City say 
criminal jury trials are disappearing). 
 114. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 671, 672 (2009); Langbein, supra note 113, at 12 (“we make it terribly costly 
for an accused to claim his right to the constitutional safeguard of trial”). 
 115. Alschuler supra note 114, at 672. 
 116. FISHER, supra note 89, at 118 (evidence is uncertain, but “increasing trial 
length may have played a part in the surge of plea bargaining in murder cases in the 
1890s” in Middlesex County, Massachusetts). 
 117. Schulhofer, supra note 110, at 2001, 2006. 
 118. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1943, 1948 (stating that plea contract is 
“inefficient because it fails to exploit the risk reduction potential of defendants’ pri-
vate knowledge,” and inefficiency is worse than appears because innocent defendants 
are “risk averse” and “impact of conviction is so great” that they “might well avoid 
that risk even at the cost of accepting a deal that treats them as if they were certain to 
be convicted at trial”). 
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Stuntz do not think these changes would fix everything, calling them “ad-
justment[s]” of a “second-best” nature that would help “at the margin,” but 
they also think abolishing plea bargaining would be worse.119  Schulhofer 
thinks these reforms “nibble at the edges” of the problem.120  Others have 
advanced similar proposals for judicial supervision constraining prosecutors 
at the trial stage121 and proposals to involve judges in the bargaining process 
itself.122 
Despite barrages of modern criticism, plea bargaining persists.  The only 
effort toward complete abolition occurred in Alaska in 1975, but Alaska re-
turned to plea bargaining in 1980, and the experience did not yield a clear 
picture of impact on the system.123  In 2016, Alaska instituted a second re-
form effort, limiting plea bargaining without trying to eliminate it altogeth-
er.124 
As critics of the present system, abolitionists and reformers usually 
make four points, three of which deal with what can be called “inputs,” and 
one of which deals with what we might call “outputs.”  On the input side are 
the legislative tendency to overcriminalize, the prosecutorial tendency to 
overcharge, and the effect of mandatory sentencing law in taking power from 
judges to achieve individual justice.  On the output side is overconviction and 
overincarceration. 
(1) Overcriminalization.  There is a legislative tendency to overcrimi-
nalize.  In the modern era, this tendency is encouraged by the ongoing at-
tempt to deal with the drug problem by expanding the criminal sanction and 
increasing punishments.  Manufacturing, importing, and selling (not use or 
recreational possession) are all crimes, and criminalizing conduct involved in 
these matters invites broad statutes with vague contours.  But the tendency to 
overcriminalize is embedded more deeply in our system because legislative 
 
 119. Id. at 1947, 1950, 1952; see also FISHER, supra note 89, at 213 (arguing that 
balance of power between prosecutor and judge would improve by letting judge im-
pose more lenient terms than prosecutor prefers).  
 120. Schulhofer, supra note 110, at 1979. 
 121. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-
Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237 (2008) (making the case that courts should 
limit difference between trial outcome and sentence to which defendant had agreed). 
 122. Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests that Judges 
Should Be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1667 (2013) (ar-
guing for participation of judges in plea bargaining process). 
 123. Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” Plea Bargain-
ing?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 774–77 
(1998). 
 124. See Jill Burke, Will Alaska’s Plea Bargain Plan Serve Justice, or Cause It to 
Grind to a Halt?, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/article/will-alaskas-plea-bargain-plan-serve-
justice-or-cause-it-grind-halt/2013/08/14/. 
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bodies are “more concerned with capturing all the behavior that they wish to 
punish than with excluding all the behavior that they wish to leave alone.”125 
(2) Overcharging.  A prosecutorial tendency to overcharge is also built 
into our system.  Prosecutors are more likely to face criticism for undercharg-
ing than for overcharging, so the political incentives point in only one direc-
tion.  Concerns to catch and try and punish criminals seem always to catch 
the eye of voters far more than concerns over the treatment of persons ac-
cused of crime.  In a world preoccupied by shootings in public places, by 
startling and troubling incidents of sexual assault, and by violence against 
police and by police, these voter concerns are even more salient.  The preva-
lence of plea bargaining and scarcity of trial magnify this incentive.  If the 
prosecutor knows that defense counsel does not want to try the case, indeed 
cannot do so and keep her workload under control, the prosecutor has more 
reason to overcharge – both “horizontally” by fragmenting criminal conduct 
into as many different offenses as possible and “vertically” by charging of-
fenses at the highest level that the facts can be stretched to suggest.126  One 
commentator describes the phenomenon thus: 
 
If our criminal justice system were trial-centered, prosecutors 
would only have reason to file charges on which they would likely se-
cure a conviction.  However, because most criminal convictions are 
secured through plea negotiations, prosecutors have an incentive to 
file more serious charges than those supported by the evidence with 
the “hope that a defendant will be risk averse.”  Furthermore, prosecu-
tors lack any political incentive to refrain from overcharging because 
most communities want the state to be tough on crime.127 
 
Prosecutors not only overcharge (particularly in the federal system, 
where much of the war on drugs is waged), but they can hold out the incen-
tive to defendants of making a motion to reduce the resultant sentence if the 
defendant proves useful in the prosecution of others.  In other words, prose-
cutors can obtain a distinct benefit from overcharging by entering into a deal 
that includes a plea to the overcharged offense, using the promised motion to 
reduce the sentence as an incentive to ensure the defendant is helpful in put-
ting others behind bars.128 
 
 125. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1962. 
 126. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 50, 85–87 (1968); see also Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 701, 703 (2014) (suggesting on basis of empirical study that some federal charging 
patterns “raise yellow, if not red, flags regarding systemic overcharging”). 
 127. H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge 
of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 84 (2011) (quoting Ronald Wright & 
Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 85 (2002)). 
 128. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1(a)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 1989) (authorizing reduction in sentence because of “the significance and 
1054 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
This problem has begun to creep into public consciousness, as is illus-
trated by two modern examples involving white middle-class women.  The 
novel Orange Is the New Black (Piper Kerman) tells of a woman who gradu-
ated from Smith College in 1993, and made bad decisions that led to her car-
rying laundered money for a drug dealer, which in turn led to her arrest and 
conviction eleven years later (she had taken a job as a freelance producer in 
New York and was living with her boyfriend).  She spent a year in prison in 
Danbury, Connecticut.  The book spawned a successful award-winning TV 
series on Netflix.129  A second example is the 60 Minutes broadcast in April 
2016, which told the story of an Ohio mother who turned in her adult daugh-
ter Jenna Morrison for stealing cash and credit cards from the mother’s purse 
because Jenna had a drug problem and her mother thought this step would get 
her attention.  She anticipated that Jenna would be charged with a misde-
meanor and spend a short time in jail.  Instead she was charged with nine 
felony counts for drug trafficking and was posted as a drug offender on a law 
enforcement website.  Hardin County prosecutor Bradford Bailey said Jenna 
got what she deserved (“[e]verything she’s done she’s chosen to do”).130  
Another 60 Minutes broadcast, this one airing in April 2017, explored the 
decision of a public defender’s office in New Orleans to refuse to handle fel-
ony cases in which the charges could lead to life in prison.  Interviewed by 
Anderson Cooper, a group of nine lawyers from that office agreed they had 
all helped clients plead guilty to charges of which they were factually inno-
cent.131 
Other examples involving child pornography suggest serious overappli-
cation of criminal sanctions.  Even minor offenses, such as exchanging nude 
photographs between a seventeen-year-old boyfriend and his seventeen-year-
old girlfriend, led to felony charges in North Carolina, where the age of con-
sent is sixteen years.132  In an unrelated case arising in New York, an extraor-
dinary federal judge wrote a detailed critique of the treatment of such offend-
 
usefulness of the defendant’s assistance”), invalidated by United States v. Detwiler, 
338 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Or. 2004). 
 129. See PIPER KERMAN, ORANGE IS THE NEW BLACK: MY YEAR IN A WOMEN’S 
PRISON (2010); see also Orange Is the New Black (Netflix 2013) (starring Taylor 
Schilling as Piper Chapman, the show began its fifth season in 2017). 
 130. Bill Whitaker, Heroin Epidemic Kills at Least 23 Ohioans Each Week, CBS 
NEWS (Apr. 24, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-heroin-epidemic-
ohio-bill-whitaker/ (Ohio now has ninety-one drug courts designed to enable addicts 
to avoid criminality, yet Attorney General DeWine said, “we’re not gonna arrest our 
way out of this problem”). 
 131. Cooper, supra note 55.  Derwyn Bunton, chief public defender in New Orle-
ans, states that he has a fifty-two-lawyer staff handling more than 20,000 defendants 
and that in those conditions “you can’t provide the kind of representation that the 
Constitution, our code of ethics and professional standards” require.  Id. 
 132. See Jacob Sullum, The Unjust, Irrational, and Unconstitutional Consequenc-
es of Pedophilia Panic, REASON (Apr. 2017), 
https://reason.com/archives/2017/03/15/sex-and-kids. 
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ers, concluding that several categories in Federal Sentencing Guidelines “tend 
to apply indiscriminately to all” such offenders, “greatly increasing the rec-
ommended punishment range without necessarily reflecting an individual’s 
heightened level of culpability.”  Judge Weinstein declined to order incar-
ceration for eight years (possible under the Guidelines) and imposed a much 
lighter sentence: The fifty-two-year-old Puerto Rican man who had down-
loaded pornography from the internet was not shown to have had “inappro-
priate physical sexual contact with a minor” or to be a danger to children, and 
the judge sentenced him to seven years of supervised release plus payment of 
$2000 in restitution.133 
To make the point another way, the kinds of market forces that offer as-
surance of fair pricing cannot be had here: When Jenna Morrison faced a 
prosecutor bringing nine felony charges after her mother had turned her in for 
the theft of cash and credit cards, she could not go to neighboring Hancock 
County, which has a drug court and a different attitude toward drug abuse.  
An alternative approach to this problem of incentivizing prosecutors to bar-
gain responsibly suggests the possibility of financial rewards for a prosecutor 
who obtains an outcome at trial that matches her earliest offer.134 
(3) Mandatory Sentencing.  The coming of mandatory sentencing, a 
tribute to the quest for equality over individual justice, contributes considera-
bly to the power of the prosecutor in plea bargaining.  In today’s world, in the 
federal system especially, the range of punishment is mostly set by the prose-
cutor in the charging decision and not by the court.135  Although the Guide-
lines provide courts with some tools to moderate the sentence imposed (con-
sidering all relevant conduct by the defendant and rejecting bargains that 
would “undermine” the Guidelines), they have not operated effectively as 
checks on prosecutorial power because judges lack incentive to intervene.136  
In reality, the judge is relegated to the role of assuring that a bargain is 
“knowing and voluntary,” which words sound eerily out of place in a system 
in which defendants waive rights in advance (so much for knowing) and have 
 
 133. United States v. R.V., 157 F. Supp. 3d 207, 211–12, 265–67 (E.D.N.Y. 
2016) (describing history of child pornography, sentencing guidelines, treatment 
options, dangers and damages to children, and also describing other instances of se-
vere sentences for less serious offenses in an exhaustive opinion by Judge Weinstein). 
 134. Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 852 
(1995). 
 135. See Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration: 
Reforming the Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining, 15 U. MD. 
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 191, 192 (2015); Lucian E. Dervan, Over-
criminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and Over-
criminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 653 (2011). 
 136. FISHER, supra note 89, at 213 (arguing that there is no reason to suppose that 
a trial judge would want “to frustrate a prosecutorial deal in the average case by de-
manding harsher terms than the prosecutor thinks right”). 
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no realistic choice but to accept a plea (so much for voluntary).  A sitting 
federal judge puts it this way: 
 
In most cases, in most American jurisdictions, the actual system 
of justice is not the one we read about in civics books and thrill to in 
the occasional real or fictional courtroom drama.  In our real justice 
system, the prosecutor is the effective adjudicator of guilt or inno-
cence and the de facto sentencing authority.137 
 
(4) Overconviction; Overincarceration.  In a system that tolerates over-
charging, it is not surprising to find overconviction, meaning people convict-
ed on guilty pleas for crimes that are more serious than the facts would war-
rant, and even to find that factually innocent defendants are convicted on 
guilty pleas.  These outcomes are part of what is now recognized as a prob-
lem of overincarceration. 
That plea bargaining leads to defendants pleading guilty to crimes they 
could not be convicted of, and even to convictions of the innocent, is aptly 
explained in these words by a former criminal defense lawyer, who has expe-
rience in both private practice and the Federal Public Defender’s Office: 
 
Brutal, all-or-nothing choices between the uncertainty of trial, with its 
massive sentencing penalty, and complete surrender by guilty plea in-
crease the likelihood that innocent defendants will plead guilty.  Left 
to the choice between, for example, a two- or three-year sentence on a 
simple felon-in-possession charge or a 30-to-life guideline range after 
trial, very few rational defendants will reject the offer.  Guilt or inno-
cence becomes largely immaterial and the effective burden of proof 
for the prosecution is little more than probable cause.138 
 
The view that plea bargaining in fact results in convicting the innocent 
finds at least anecdotal support and some support in empirical findings based 
on experiments in which innocent participants charged with wrongdoing were 
willing to admit to minor offenses to avoid larger stigmas.139  Numerous 
commentators agree that this problem exists.140 
 
 137. See Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
39, 39 (2012). 
 138. Gregory M. Gilchrist, Bargaining for More Trials, 60 CHAMPION 20, 20–21 
(2016); accord Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 IOWA L. REV. 609, 632–
33 (2016) (arguing that plea bargaining can reduce the effective burden of proof); 
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2123 (1998) (attributing problem to “unfortunate maldistribution of re-
sources” rather than “any intrinsic difference between bargained or administered 
justice” and trial system). 
 139. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Crimi-
nal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 926 (describing innocent man 
convicted of charge to which he had pled guilty); Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining 
Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 616 (2013) (citing statistics that 
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There are signs the Court is taking another look at plea bargaining, alt-
hough not with any idea of abolishing it or even instituting major reforms.  
Instead, the focus seems to be adding another checking mechanism on the 
system.  This new departure was signaled in the 2012 Frye and Lafler deci-
sions, which extended some constitutional protection to the accused against 
inadequate lawyer performance in plea bargaining.  In Frye, defense counsel 
failed to communicate an offer in timely fashion to the defendant, and the 
offer expired, leading to a plea of guilty to a felony (and a sentence of three 
years in prison) instead of the offered misdemeanor plea.141  In Lafler, de-
fense counsel told his client he could not be convicted of assault with intent 
to commit murder in a case involving four gunshots because they struck the 
victim below the waist.  The defendant turned down a plea carrying a sen-
tence that was one third of what he received on being convicted (51–85 
months was offered; the sentence was 185–360 months).142 
These decisions are breakthroughs in the sense that they bring some 
standards to bear on a critical part of the process that has largely escaped 
judicial scrutiny.143  But they promise only the slightest impact on the sys-
tem.144  Alschuler calls them “a tiny step” in the right direction to fix a sys-
tem that has “gone off the tracks, and the rails themselves have disappeared,” 
leaving only a hope that the system can be made “less awful.”145  Consistent 
with that modest aspiration, commentators building on Frye and Lafler have 
advanced proposals for broader judicial oversight, which include holding 
defense lawyers to professional standards not only in advising clients (the 
 
indicate that nine percent of defendants ultimately exonerated had pled guilty); Luci-
an E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innova-
tive Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 34–35 (2013) (in an experiment comparing students who cheated in 
staged exercise with students who did not, nine out of ten “guilty” ones and six out of 
ten “innocent” ones accepted a pretend deal). 
 140. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 139, at 927; Guidorizzi, supra note 123, at 
771 (serious concern with plea bargaining is “the increased risk of innocent defend-
ants pleading guilty”); Robert Schehr, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Intellectual Dis-
honesty and the Unconstitutionality of Plea-Bargaining, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 385, 
389–90 (2015) (recounting the story of a former defense attorney who “would rather 
see his innocent clients plead guilty than to experience the degradation, humiliation, 
and systemic violence that would accrue by seeking an acquittal at trial”). 
 141. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 139 (2012). 
 142. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 161, 174 (2012). 
 143. See Lynch, supra note 137, at 42. 
 144. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 
2665–69 (2013) (suggesting standards to measure adequacy of counsel during bar-
gaining); Laurie L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri 
v. Frye & Lafler v. Cooper, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 457, 487 (2013) (suggesting best 
practices). 
 145. Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering 
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 706–07 (2013). 
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focus in Frye and Lafler) but in conducting the back-and-forth with prosecu-
tors too.146 
It has been suggested that prosecutors should be barred from taking pri-
or arrests into consideration in making offers during plea bargaining.147  In 
the article already cited, Alschuler argues that reforms should aim toward 
making trials more available (he adds that they should also aim to avoid over-
criminalization, avoid expansion of federal criminal law and severe punish-
ments, and provide funding for indigent defense).  Before being appointed in 
2017 to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Judge Stephanos 
Bibas drew an analogy between plea bargaining and ordinary consumer con-
tracts, suggesting that plea bargaining should be regulated in analogous 
ways.148  With a similar end in sight, Professor Rishi Raj Batra suggests des-
ignating a judge other than the sentencing judge to supervise the plea bargain-
ing process.149 
Missing from this extended conversation is any recognition of the role 
of Mezzanatto waivers.  If prosecutors could not force defendants to give up 
their right to exclude plea bargaining statements, they would be less able to 
push defendants into pleading guilty when they are innocent of any crime or 
when they could not be convicted of the crime covered by the plea.  And 
abolishing Mezzanatto waivers would fit well with some of the suggested 
reforms, such as sending someone from the prosecutor’s office who will not 
handle the negotiation to explain the situation to the defendant and listen to 
what he has to say about what happened and why he has decided to enter a 
plea.150  Doing away with these waivers would allow a conversation to go 
forward that does not shape the outcome simply because it happened. 
 
 146. See Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence Be-
yond Lafler and Frye, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 407 (2016). 
 147. Besiki Luka Kutateladze & Victoria Z. Lawson, How Bad Arrests Lead to 
Bad Prosecution: Exploring the Impact of Prior Arrests on Plea Bargaining, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 973, 992–93 (2016). 
 148. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat 
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1153 (2011). 
 149. Rishi Raj Batra, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Dispute Reso-
lution Perspective, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 565, 587–89 (2015); see also Daniel S. 
McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 65 
(2015) (defendants should be allowed to request from the court a guilty plea sentence 
and a post-trial sentence, thus allowing the court to assess in sentencing factors such 
as the strength of the prosecutor’s case and the potential for “undue coerciveness”). 
 150. See Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Plea Bargaining as Dialogue, 49 AKRON L. REV. 
63, 66 (2016) (the process “should not only give defendants fair treatment, but it 
should also make them feel that they received fair treatment,” which has “therapeutic 
effect,” making defendants “willing more readily to accept responsibility”). 
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B.  They Produce Untrustworthy Statements 
Statements made by defendants to prosecutors during plea bargaining 
are hearsay if offered at a later trial to prove the matters asserted,151 but the 
hearsay doctrine does not block the use of the defendant’s own statements 
against him.152  They are the defendant’s admissions and can be used against 
him unless they are excludable under some other principle.  And the admis-
sions doctrine is not limited by a reliability criterion.153 
When we speak of the defendant’s plea bargaining statements, however, 
we encounter reliability issues that are unusually acute.  To start with, what a 
defendant says during plea bargaining is unreliable because of the two double 
binds that affect him: He must incriminate himself to make a deal, even 
though doing so closes him in a trap from which he has no retreat, and he 
must say everything that might be relevant to some charge or risk impeach-
ment in the event of trial if he leaves something out and says it later.  Such 
admissions should not be usable against defendants because the usual reasons 
we exempt admissions from any reliability requirement do not hold up.  We 
usually say a party can take the stand and explain himself, and he has no basis 
to complain that he was not under oath or subject to cross when he spoke.154  
But it will be impossible for a defendant to explain to a jury how the dynam-
ics of conversations with the prosecutor led the defendant to say what he said, 
and that he was incriminating himself in fear of more severe charges or pun-
ishments, and that his lawyer encouraged him to do so.  These explanations 
will sound incredible, and they expose the defendant to suggestions of having 
committed other crimes. 
In analogous situations, statutes block resort to the admissions doctrine 
– statutes not unlike Rule 410.155  Thus, for example, statutes commonly bar 
the use in civil damage suits of pleas to traffic offenses, enabling violators to 
pay traffic tickets without fearing that doing so concedes civil liability to an 
injured party.156  And statutes in many states bar the use against a person of 
statements he makes to insurance adjusters shortly after accidents.157  There 
are other policy bases that result in excluding statements that might otherwise 
qualify as admissions: Thus some statutes exclude statements of apology on 
 
 151. See FRE 801(c). 
 152. FRE 801(d)(2)(A). 
 153. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8:44 (4th 
ed. 2017) (for admissions there “is no requirement that statements offered as individ-
ual admissions satisfy any standard of reliability”). 
 154. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 94, at § 254. 
 155. FRE 410(a)(4). 
 156. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 318.14(4)(b) (West 2017) (paying noncriminal traffic fine 
constitutes admission of infraction, which “shall not be used as evidence in any other 
proceedings”). 
 157. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 602.01 (West 2017) (“statement secured from 
an injured person” within thirty days is “presumably fraudulent” in any trial for dam-
ages). 
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the theory that wronged and injured parties may want and benefit from such 
an acknowledgement, and it is socially useful to encourage wrongdoers to 
express sympathy and regret for what they have done.158  There is also the 
rule blocking the use of evidence of insurance when offered to prove either 
wrongdoing or due care.159  And there is the rule blocking proof of payment 
of medical expenses (or commitments to do so) when offered against the par-
ty who provides or commits to do so.160 
Indeed, implicit in Rule 410 is the notion that giving defendants a 
chance at trial to explain the things they conceded in an attempt to bargain a 
plea is not good enough, even though this rationale differs from the reasons 
found in legislative and rulemaking history behind the provision. 
It was the difficulties brought by the use against one defendant of state-
ments to officials made by another defendant that led to the revolution in 
confrontation jurisprudence that came with the Crawford case in 2004.161  
Pre-Crawford cases expanded the against-interest exception162 to embrace 
plea bargaining statements, and Crawford cites and dismisses several of these 
decisions in its embrace of the proposition that the confrontation clause ap-
plies to “testimonial” hearsay.163  Crawford effectively put an end to any ar-
gument that what a defendant says to officials – both police and prosecutors – 
in any attempt to deal with criminal charges in plea bargaining can be admit-
ted against some other defendant in another case.  Even if the statement satis-
fies the against-interest exception, it is testimonial and cannot be admitted 
unless the new defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant 
before trial (as might happen at a preliminary hearing).  It is in just such cir-
cumstances, when a defendant seeks to “curry favor” with authorities, as we 
 
 158. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (West 2017) (excluding in civil actions “state-
ments, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of 
benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in an acci-
dent”). 
 159. FRE 411 (fact of insurance is inadmissible to prove that insured person “act-
ed negligently or otherwise wrongfully”). 
 160. FRE 409 (furnishing or promising to pay medical or similar expenses is not 
admissible to prove liability for injury). 
 161. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 162. See FRE 804(b)(3)(A)–(B) (paving the way to admit a statement by an una-
vailable declarant if it has “so great a tendency” to expose the speaker to “criminal 
liability,” that the statement would only have been made if the declarant “believed it 
to be true,” and if there are “corroborating circumstances” where the statement is 
offered against the defendant in a criminal case). 
 163. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63–64 (including the following two cases as ex-
amples of the “unpardonable vice” of a system in which confrontation jurisprudence 
turned on reliability: United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021–23 (9th Cir. 
2002) and United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) (both admitting 
against one defendant the guilty plea allocutions of another)). 
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saw Shuster and Mezzanatto doing, that appraisals of trustworthiness or relia-
bility become difficult or impossible.164 
In a 1978 decision, Justice Jim Carrigan of the Colorado Supreme Court 
put his finger on the problem, and in the process explained why plea bargain-
ing statements should not be admitted, even against their maker: 
 
No matter what the real reason for a bargained guilty plea may 
be in any particular case, whether or not the trial court will accept that 
plea generally depends on its determination that the plea has a “factual 
basis.”  Such a determination, in turn, requires the defendant or his 
counsel to satisfy the court that the defendant’s conduct giving rise to 
the more serious charges provides an adequate factual predicate to 
support a finding that he is guilty of the crime to which he wants to 
plead.  Therefore, regardless of his reasons for negotiating a plea bar-
gain, a defendant is placed in the inherently coercive situation of ei-
ther providing the court with that factual basis or having the court re-
fuse to accept his plea and force him to trial on the more grave charg-
es.  In such circumstances, a defendant may feel constrained to state 
what all in the courtroom expect of him, [i].e., sufficient facts connect-
ing him to the criminal incident to assure that his plea will be accept-
ed.  In my opinion, statements made under such compulsion, however 
subtle, cannot be viewed as “voluntary,” and therefore their trustwor-
thiness is unreliable at best.165   
 
Carrigan got it right. 
Langbein got it right too, when he said, “Plea bargaining puts the ac-
cused under ferocious pressure to bear false witness against himself.”166  As 
with the problem of overcharging, the common sense behind this proposition 
has begun to make its way into the popular consciousness.  Again, we can 
draw on a 60 Minutes broadcast, this one airing in May 2017, in which Mark 
Cleveland told correspondent Sharyn Alfonsi that he (Cleveland) had become 
part of a regular process of providing false information against others in the 
Orange County Jail in California in order to get time off his sentences.167 
 
 164. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 601–02 (1994) (for different 
reasons, nine Justices agree that statements by one co-offender to law enforcement 
cannot be admitted against another; such statements are self-interested in that the 
speaker curries favor for himself by promising to help convict another). 
 165. People v. Cole, 584 P.2d 71, 77 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (Carrigan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted); see also Rands v. State, 818 
P.2d 44, 52 (Wyo. 1991) (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Carrigan’s dis-
senting opinion in Cole at length). 
 166. John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance 
of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 124 (1992). 
 167. Snitches, CBS NEWS (May 21, 2017, 8:20 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/videos/snitches/ (jailhouse informant Mark Cleveland 
comments that “the propensity for unreliability is huge,” that snitches are willing to 
“say anything,” that if they “need to [lie], they will” because “it’s about getting [out 
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If plea bargaining continues, at least we should not be in the business of 
convicting defendants at trial when the process fails on account of what was 
said when defendants are put under pressure to incriminate themselves to 
minimize their punishments. 
C.  They Are Unenforceable Contracts 
A plea agreement is a contract, and cases without number invoke princi-
ples of contract law in dealing with the issues that arise.168  But it is a contract 
of a special kind because it is negotiated in the absence of a crucial party – 
the court, which can affect the promises made on both sides.  The court in-
forms the defendant of his rights, ensures that a plea has a factual basis, re-
views the recommended sentence, and ensures that it is legal and appropriate 
under statutes and Sentencing Guidelines.  In the end, a court can reject an 
agreement if the sentence does not comport with the Sentencing Guidelines 
and can let a defendant withdraw a plea.169  Judicial scrutiny has not been 
effective in curbing prosecutorial abuse of the plea bargaining system (partic-
ularly overcharging), but judges are supposed to serve the larger public inter-
est, which includes scrutinizing and rejecting Mezzanatto waivers when they 
are improper and enforcing the formal requirements of the plea bargaining 
process.  Judges have more freedom here to modify terms or decline en-
forcement than they have in applying typical commercial contracts.170 
 
of] jail”) (District Attorney Anthony Joseph Rackauckas, Jr., also interviewed, denied 
that his office acted improperly with Cleveland or others).  Reportedly these matters 
are under investigation.  See Frank Shyong, O.C. Supervisor Todd Spitzer Calls for 
Federal Oversight of District Attorney’s Office, L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2017, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-oc-spitzer-rackauckas-20170522-
story.html.  In April 2017, that program aired a segment on a public defender’s office 
in New Orleans that has begun to refuse to handle felony cases.  Interviewed by An-
derson Cooper, a group of nine lawyers all agreed that they had helped their clients 
plead guilty to charges of which they were factually innocent.  Cooper, supra note 55. 
 168. See Michael D. Cicchini, Broken Government Promises: A Contract-Based 
Approach to Enforcing Plea Bargains, 38 N.M. L. REV. 159, 173 (2008). 
 169. See generally id. (discussing instances of withdrawal). 
 170. See United States v. Seleznev, No. CR 11-70 RAJ, 2016 WL 1720762, at *2 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 2016) (plea agreements are “construed narrowly because they 
‘are unique contracts in which special due process concerns for fairness and the ade-
quacy for procedural safeguards obtain’” (quoting United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 
551, 558 (2d. Cir. 1996), superseded on other grounds by United States v. Mergen, 
764 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2014))); United States v. Lauersen, No. 98CR1134(WHP), 
2000 WL 1693538, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000) (plea agreements are construed 
“strictly against the Government,” as the Government typically drafts the plea agree-
ment and has advantages in bargaining power; courts also consider agreements 
against a “background understanding of legality” and apply “general fairness princi-
ples”); DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: 
SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 5.9.5 (Supp. 2018) (courts should 
“assess the enforceability of plea agreements, even in the face of defendant’s breach 
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When it comes to enforcing plea agreements against prosecutors, the 
remedy of specific performance is available: If a prosecutor tries to withdraw 
from or repudiate a plea agreement without justification, she can be forced to 
comply with its terms or the defendant is entitled to withdraw from the 
plea.171  Invariably, a prosecutor who chooses this course argues that the de-
fendant did not live up to his end of the deal, usually because the defendant 
lied, did not cooperate in another investigation, refused to testify in another 
trial, or testified in a manner inconsistent with what he said before.  In sum, 
the question is whether the defendant’s material breach excuses the prosecu-
tor from performing and whether that breach paves the way for other charges 
or a more severe sentence.172 
Probably a defendant cannot be compelled to perform a promise to plead 
guilty, and courts sometimes construe a plea agreement as an offer for a uni-
lateral contract in which a guilty plea accepts the prosecutor’s offer.173  But a 
written plea agreement is usually a bilateral executory contract creating obli-
gations on both sides – the prosecutor is to advance certain charges, the de-
fendant is to enter a plea, and the prosecutor is to agree to the plea and rec-
ommend a certain sentence.  Usually the agreement says the defendant’s re-
fusal to perform, or his withdrawal of a plea, releases the prosecutor from her 
commitments,174  although it does not usually release the defendant from his 
Mezzanatto waiver.  The defendant can commit to testify truthfully in other 
trials but not to testify in a certain manner or to strive to convict another.175  
Courts, however, manage to fudge the difference by approving commitments 
 
of their terms, by looking both to principles of contract interpretation and to the inter-
ests of justice”). 
 171. See State v. Saenz, 373 P.3d 220, 222 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) (district court, in 
effect, granted specific performance by resentencing defendant according to original 
agreement after breach of agreement); see also State v. Rivers, 931 A.2d 185, 196–98 
(Conn. 2007) (ordering a lower court to grant specific performance of a plea agree-
ment); United States v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1989) (when prosecutors 
breach, defendants are entitled to specific performance or a chance to withdraw their 
pleas). 
 172. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (defendant’s breach of 
plea agreement excuses state from performing; defendant, who had pled guilty to 
second-degree murder, could now be tried for first-degree murder). 
 173. See Bowers v. State, 500 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ind. 1986) (likening plea agree-
ment to unilateral contract; when defendant performs, prosecutor cannot renege); 
Pichierri v. People, 58 V.I. 516, 526 (V.I. 2013) (plea agreements are “unilateral con-
tracts,” and when a defendant performs by entering the plea, the government may not 
withdraw); State v. King, 721 S.E.2d 327, 330 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State v. 
Collins, 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (N.C. 1980)) (finding same). 
 174. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, at §21.2(e) (describing available remedies for 
breach). 
 175. See State v. Fisher, 859 P.2d 179, 182–83, 186–87 (Ariz. 1993) (trial court 
properly granted a new trial and declared unenforceable a plea agreement requiring 
defendant witness to testify in manner that would not “vary substantially” from prior 
statements). 
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to testify in a manner consistent with prior statements, at least if the agree-
ment also commits the defendant to be truthful.176  It is hard to imagine that 
many defendants can mistake the import of such agreements: If they do not 
testify as the prosecutor wants, they cannot count on her delivering on her 
promise when it comes to the disposition of their own cases. 
Where the terms of an agreement are in issue, or performance by the 
parties, defendants have won little victories.  The meaning of the agreements 
is for the judge to determine, as is the question of breach, and plea agree-
ments are construed strictly against the prosecutor who drafts them.177  It is 
usually said that Mezzanatto waivers can be set aside if they would cause a 
“miscarriage of justice” (a hard standard to meet)178 and are narrowly con-
strued against the government (inevitably the prosecutor’s office drafts these 
agreements).  Sometimes the result is that the defendant’s statements are not 
admissible to contradict defense witnesses179 or statements by defense coun-
sel180 because language in the agreement does not reach such uses.  It seems 
that the prosecutor bears the burden of proving that a proffer agreement was 
signed knowingly and voluntarily,181 although there is no unanimity on this 
 
 176. People v. Bannister, 923 N.E.2d 244, 253 (Ill. 2009) (approving conviction 
based on testimony secured pursuant to plea agreement obliging witness to testify 
truthfully but also promising to testify consistently with prior statements because the 
requirement to testify truthfully was “the overriding requirement of the agreement”). 
 177. United States v. Rivera, 117 F. Supp. 3d 172, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (proffers 
are “construed strictly against the government” and ambiguities resolved against it). 
 178. United States v. Rosemond, 841 F.3d 95, 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2016) (waiver let 
government use defendant’s statements to rebut evidence or factual assertions offered 
or elicited by or on his behalf; defendant should have been allowed to argue, “without 
triggering the proffer waiver,” that government failed to prove he intended to commit 
murder; defense challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, even if they “carry with 
them the inference that events did not actually occur” are not “factual assertions” 
because “they do not propose an alternate version of events”); United States v. Fazio, 
795 F.3d 421, 426 (3d Cir. 2015) (plea agreement waivers are enforceable unless they 
work miscarriages of justice). 
 179. See United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2015) (waiver 
covered use of proffer statements to cross-examine and impeach defendant if he testi-
fied, not the right to use them in cross-examining defense witnesses). 
 180. See United States v. Seleznev, No. CR 11-70 RAJ, 2016 WL 1720762, at *3 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 2016) (refusing to admit defendant’s statements to contradict 
arguments by his lawyer; defendant understood that “he, personally, could not testify 
inconsistently” with his statements but not that the same limit applied to his attor-
neys). 
 181. Compare United States v. Escobedo, 757 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2014), 
United States v Riedman, No. 11–CR–6083CJS, 2014 WL 713552, at *26 (W.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 18, 2014), and United States v. Paris, No. 3:06–cr–0064 (CFD), 2007 WL 
1158118, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2007) (all saying government has burden of proof), 
with United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 810 (10th Cir. 2015) (defendant has the bur-
den of proof), and United States v. Conroy, Nos. 14–1120 & 06–425, 2014 WL 
5426255, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2014) (defendant has the burden of presenting 
evidence). 
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point and some decisions put this burden on the defendant.182  There are signs 
that judges are uncomfortable with Mezzanatto waivers because they are so 
complex that a defendant who lacks legal education is not likely to under-
stand what he is giving up.183 
These little victories are not enough.  As a matter of contract law, Mez-
zanatto waivers should be unenforceable for two reasons. 
The first reason applies to advance or proffer waivers.  These should fail 
for want of consideration.  The defendant promises to give up his right under 
Rule 410 to exclude whatever he thereafter says.  No consideration supports 
enforcement of this promise because the prosecutor provides no benefit and 
gives up nothing: Taking advantage of the leverage that arrest provides, she 
offers no assurance that a deal can be had, that she will compromise in any 
way, or that she will abandon any contemplated charges that the facts might 
support.  In effect, the prosecutor says, “If you’re willing to waive some 
rights to talk a deal, I am willing to talk too; let’s see what we can work out.”  
This supposed concession is not consideration.  The Restatement Second of 
Contracts offers an apt example: A offers to deliver to B “at $2 a bushel as 
many bushels of wheat, not exceeding 5,000, as B may choose to order within 
the next 30 days,” and B agrees “to buy at that price as much as he shall order 
from A within that time.”  B’s acceptance, says the Restatement, “involves no 
promise by him, and is not consideration.”184  The promise to buy from A at a 
certain price all the wheat that B might decide to buy from A is not considera-
tion because B does not actually commit to buying anything at all from A.  
Similarly, the prosecutor’s agreement to talk does not actually commit the 
prosecutor to make any kind of deal at all with the defendant. 
It might be suggested that agreeing to talk is itself consideration.  If so, 
it is what the Restatement calls “illusory” consideration.  It is true that courts 
routinely say that prosecutors have no duty to bargain with defendants,185 but 
this proposition is best understood to mean that a prosecutor has discretion in 
 
 182. See Jim, 786 F.3d at 810 (it was defendant’s burden “to show that his guilty 
plea was not knowing or voluntary”). 
 183. United States v. Brooks, No. 14-382 (RMB), 2015 WL 6509016, at *2–3 
(D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2015) (refusing to enforce waiver allowing use of his statements on 
cross and to rebut defense evidence; court questioned whether defendant “actually 
comprehended the explanations,” concluding that he was “genuinely confused”). 
 184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981); see also Robison, supra note 99, at 683–84 (waiver compels defendant to 
provide consideration “upfront, before he receives anything in return,” so he gives up 
his rights “merely for the opportunity to bargain,” leaving him with nothing; waiver is 
“an illusory contract”). 
 185. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (there is “no constitutional 
right to plea bargain”); see also Britton v. Commonwealth, No. 2014–SC–000659–
TG, 2015 WL 3637486, at *4 (Ky. June 11, 2015) (a prosecutor may engage in bar-
gaining “in his sole discretion,” as “no duty to bargain exists”); Gov’t of V.I. v. Scot-
land, 614 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1980) (prosecutor is “under no duty to plea bargain if 
no offer is made”). 
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deciding what charges are appropriate and whether there is any room for 
compromise and that a prosecutor can insist on going to trial on serious 
charges if the facts and circumstances warrant.   
In fact, such comments about prosecutorial discretion simply do not set-
tle the matter of duty.  After all, duties arise out of circumstances, custom, 
and risks to human and social wellbeing.186  The many duties of the prosecu-
tor have been spelled out, and they include bringing only charges that she can 
support with evidence and seeking just outcomes – not simply convictions on 
the most serious possible charges.  Given the pervasiveness of plea bargain-
ing and the utter dependence of the system on this practice – and we are 
speaking now of prosecutors, courts, public defenders, and the entire criminal 
justice system – it is simply unconvincing and unrealistic to insist that prose-
cutors have discretion to refuse to bargain.  Everyone understands that prose-
cutors can insist on bringing more serious charges than a defendant is willing 
to accept or even talk about.187  But this proposition is too thin a reed on 
which to base the argument that prosecutors have no duty to talk.   
For this same reason, one simply cannot say with a straight face that the 
prosecutor who does sit down to talk has given up some significant right, and 
that merely talking amounts to consideration that benefits the defendant.  
Such a proposition is just nonsense.  Indeed, a more accurate account would 
hold that prosecutors have a professional duty to bargain, and the ABA Crim-
inal Justice Standards take this position.188  Courts have even disciplined 
prosecutors who refuse to bargain when facts come to light, suggesting that 
this refusal stems from improper motives.  In these situations, the court can 
order prosecutors to sit down and talk.189 
That prosecutors have this duty is enough to show that agreeing to talk 
is illusory consideration.  The Restatement offers the following example: An 
award is offered to “whoever produces evidence leading to the arrest and 
conviction of the murderer of B,” and C “produces such evidence in the per-
 
 186. See, e.g., Henderson v. Romer, 910 P.2d 48, 51 (Colo. App. 1995) (duty is 
“an obligation to conform to a legal standard of conduct that is reasonable in light of 
an apparent risk”). 
 187. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in 
a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1701 (2000) (a prosecutor has 
“substantial responsibility as investigator” and is “in a real sense, arbiter of the accu-
sation,” and her “virtually unilateral discretion . . . demands neutrality, the suspension 
of the partisan outlook, and at least until the case passes to the adversarial stage, dedi-
cation to interests that may prove antithetical to her ultimate position”). 
 188. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-
5.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (prosecutor “should be open, at every stage of a crimi-
nal matter, to discussions with defense counsel” on disposing of charges “by guilty 
plea or other negotiated disposition”). 
 189. See In re Rook, 556 P.2d 1351, 1356–57 (Or. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(disciplining prosecutor who refused to bargain with defendants represented by a 
particular lawyer); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, at § 21.3(d) (judges can become 
involved in assessing the prosecutor’s refusal to bargain). 
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formance of his duty as a police officer.”  What C has done, says the Re-
statement, “is not consideration for A’s promise” because it was done in the 
discharge of his professional duties, and it follows that A’s promise is unen-
forceable.190  Prosecutors are similarly situated to the police officer and can-
not claim that sitting down to talk supports the defendant’s Mezzanatto waiv-
er because seeking to work things out is part of the prosecutor’s professional 
obligation.  In the Duffy case, a federal trial judge struck a waiver from a 
proffer agreement for failure of consideration, which is the right thing to 
do.191  It must be said, however, that most courts continue to reject this argu-
ment.192 
The second reason Mezzanatto waivers should not be enforced as con-
tractual commitments is that they are unconscionable.  Here we speak both of 
advance waivers (entered at the beginning of proffer sessions and covering 
statements yet to come) and plea bargain waivers (entered as the parties reach 
agreement and covering statements already made and perhaps statements yet 
to come, as well as factual stipulations).  The Restatement lists, as factors 
bearing on unconscionability, “gross disparity in the values exchanged” and 
“gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably fa-
vorable to the stronger party” and indicates that the remedy in such situations 
can include “denial of specific performance.”193 
The inequality factor hardly requires explanation: There is simply no 
match between the defendant and the prosecutor, who can call on the coercive 
machinery of government and who, after all, is dealing with a person who has 
been arrested and is subject to more charges and imprisonment if he flees.194  
There is a standard response: It is said that only the defendant’s guilt puts him 
in his present handicapped position.195  To put it mildly, this argument is em-
barrassing in its naiveté (or could we call it a purposeful distortion of reali-
 
 190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. b, illus. 1 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981). But see United States v. Webb, No. 09–755–1, 2011 WL 1226120, at 
*14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2011) (rejecting argument that proffer agreement with waiver 
was “inherently illusory and unenforceable”). 
 191. United States v. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d 213, 217–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“the 
only thing that a defendant is guaranteed is the chance to convince the prosecutor to 
enter a deal,” so defendant bears “all of the risk” and the government “is under no 
obligation” and “loses nothing by declining”). 
 192. See Webb, 2011 WL 1226120, at *14–15 (finding that the contract was not 
illusory as the government obligated itself to hear what defendant had to say); United 
States v. Annette, No. 2:10–cr–131, 2012 WL 1890237, at *3 (D. Vt. May 22, 2012) 
(noting that defendant “received an opportunity to negotiate a deal”). 
 193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c–d, g (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981). 
 194. Siegle, supra note 2, at 130 (arguing that the disparity between post-trial 
sentences and reduced sentences following negotiated pleas can force defendant into a 
bargain so accepting a plea is “contrary to the requirement of a voluntary waiver of 
constitutional protections”). 
 195. United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2004) (disparity in posi-
tions is “attributable to the Government’s evidence of the defendant’s guilt”). 
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ty?), and it does not fit with the presumption of innocence which, if there is to 
be no trial, is effectively a dead letter.  Behind Franz Kafka’s chilling tale in 
The Trial is the insight that seems to inform this argument.196  In the end, 
there is simply no justification for ignoring the fear and trepidation that a 
defendant experiences in sitting down with a prosecutor or for assuming that 
it stems from guilt rather than the obvious fact that the state has chosen to 
arrest him and is in the process of bringing charges. 
As to gross disparity in the values exchanged, it is hard to imagine 
greater disparities than we see in Mezzanatto waivers.  In the case of advance 
waivers, the defendant gives up the right to try for a deal without digging 
himself into a hole in exchange for the supposed privilege of sitting down to 
talk.  In the case of plea bargain waivers, the defendant gives up that same 
right, even though formally the commitment is to tell the truth.  Realistically, 
what the defendant shoulders is a considerable obligation to repeat on the 
witness stand what he has said in talking to the prosecutor.  It is this obliga-
tion that the defendant takes on in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement to 
forego more serious charges and to recommend a certain sentence.  The 
waiver, as defendant’s commitment is called, is enforced even if the defend-
ant’s plea is not accepted or is withdrawn for just cause.  Again, the Duffy 
decision offers an example of a holding that rightly sees the manifest imbal-
ance in such arrangements.197 
In the Joyeros case, an extraordinary judge addressed the unconsciona-
bility problem in connection with a plea bargain.198  He did not speak of Mez-
zanatto waivers, but Judge Weinstein did take seriously the element of un-
conscionability and made downward modifications in the sentence to which 
the parties had agreed (reducing it from 33–41 months to 23 months followed 
by three years of supervised release).  And his comments apply at least as 
much to Mezzanatto waivers as to overall plea agreements.  “Some degree of 
 
196. As Kafka writes, 
 
[T]hose who are experienced in such matters can pick out one after another all 
the accused men in the largest of crowds.  How do they know them? you will 
ask . . . . They know them because accused men are always the most attrac-
tive.  It cannot be guilt that makes them attractive, for – it behooves me to say 
this as an Advocate, at least – they aren’t all guilty, and it cannot be the justice 
of the penance laid on them that makes them attractive in anticipation, for they 
aren’t all going to be punished, so it must be the mere charge preferred against 
them that in some way enhances their attraction.   
 
FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 231 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Alfred A. Knopf 
1937) (1925). 
 197. United States v. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d 213, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (govern-
ment has awesome advantages enhanced by the fact that Sentencing Guidelines place 
a “premium on cooperation,” putting defendants “under more pressure than ever to 
proffer” in hope of lenient sentence; waiver “exploits this power imbalance”). 
 198. United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 423–26 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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coercion,” he acknowledged, is behind many admissible confessions, and 
coercion is “inherent” in contract negotiation, even in commercial settings.  
There, however, one party cannot induce another “to agree by threat of crimi-
nal prosecution,” which makes plea bargaining different in its coercive im-
pact.  Unacceptable coercion or undue influence exists if “the stronger party 
influences the weaker party in a way that destroys the weaker party’s free 
will,” and a defendant engaging in plea bargaining may experience such fear 
that he might not have the state of mind necessary for contracting.  Indeed, 
Judge Weinstein noted, the Sentencing Guidelines themselves invite prosecu-
tors to threaten more serious charges unless the defendant accepts a deal.  
Thus, the question is whether the defendant can “rationally weigh the ad-
vantages and disadvantages” of the proffered deal and whether a reasonable 
person “might make the same decision.”  A judge must “try to be as fully 
cognizant as practicable of the circumstances leading to the plea and of the 
nature and the background of the particular defendant, including age, educa-
tion, social class, family pressures, and other relevant factors.”  In the end, 
“coercion” (at least “within limits”) does not invalidate a plea agreement, so 
long as it does not “shock the judicial conscience” or “depart substantially 
from commonly held beliefs of what is appropriate pressure.”199 
There is good reason to suspect that the very coercive effects that Judge 
Weinstein described in Joyeros actually do operate in plea bargaining, with 
the seriously distorting impact that he described.200  Yet it must be said that 
most courts continue to reject challenges to terms in plea agreements based 
on unconscionability.201  Perhaps things are changing.  In 2016, a federal 
judge in the Mutschler case refused to enforce a plea bargain waiver and 
commented that “in perhaps no other context involving such unequal bargain-
ing positions have the courts so fully abdicated their responsibility for evalu-
 
 199. Id. at 425–26 (first quoting E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.9 
(1982) on coercion as a defense in contract cases; then citing Jamestown Farmers 
Elevator, Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285, 1291 (8th Cir. 1977), on proposition 
that private party cannot coerce citizen into contract through threat of prosecution or 
regulatory inquiry; then quoting N. Am. Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 583, 
589 (6th Cir. 1993), on proposition that undue influence exists where stronger party 
destroys weaker party’s free will). 
 200. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1925–26 (citing “anchoring phenome-
non,” under which “the way choices are framed affects individuals’ assessments,” and 
commenting that defendants suffer this type of cognitive error “if the benefits from 
refusing a proposed plea bargain are anchored to the prospect of acquittal” that may 
seem remote, so anchoring the benefits of trial to the remote possibility of acquittal 
“may irredeemably impair the ability of criminal defendants to evaluate the choice 
correctly,” leading defendants “both to overestimate the likelihood of conjunctive 
events, such as events leading to conviction, and to underestimate the likelihood of 
disjunctive events, such as acquittal after trial,” to the end that “defendants may not 
be fully compensated for their guilty pleas”). 
 201. Linzy v. State, No. 01-02-00387-CR, 2003 WL 22456106, at *5 (Tex. Ct. 
App. Oct. 30, 2003) (declining to extend “contract view” of plea agreements to allow 
“affirmative defense of unconscionability”). 
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ating the conscionability of the parties’ agreement.”202  There are a few other 
decisions that take this notion seriously,203 including a lower court decision 
that relieved a driver of a guilty plea to a traffic infraction on the ground that 
his plea would result in suspension of his license because it was already re-
stricted (a point that apparently nobody had noticed), so his plea was uncon-
scionable!204 
D.  They Violate Rule 410 
1.  Rule 410 Regulates Plea Bargaining 
Most rights can be waived.  That was the insight that animated the ma-
jority opinion in Mezzanatto.  Why not treat Rule 410 as creating waivable 
rights?  The best reason is that Congress wanted to encourage plea bargaining 
and intended to regulate the process in this provision. 
Surprisingly, the question whether to admit at trial a defendant’s state-
ments to prosecutors in proffer or bargaining sessions was not talked about 
when the Rules of Evidence were drafted in the 1960s and 1970s.  Writing 
fifty years earlier, Wigmore had nothing to say on the topic,205 and McCor-
mick’s treatment of the topic just before the period of Rule formation was 
short.206  Both were writing in times when lawyers who wanted to settle cases 
(civil or criminal) had to walk on eggs, casting their conversations in hypo-
thetical terms, like “just suppose, for the sake of conversation.”  The reason 
for such tiptoeing was that naked factual assertions, whether made by lawyers 
as spokespersons for their clients or by the clients themselves, were taken as 
admissions and could be offered in evidence in a trial, even if the setting was 
a negotiation seeking a civil settlement or a plea in a criminal case.207 
 
 202. United States v. Mutschler, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1333–34 (W.D. Wash. 
2016) (striking waiver of right to appeal in opinion by Judge Zilly). 
 203. See, e.g., State v. Hess, 23 A.3d 373, 390–91 (N.J. 2011) (implying that 
provision in plea agreement preventing defense from “presenting or arguing mitigat-
ing evidence” was unenforceable, and deciding that defense lawyer’s compliance with 
this provision proved ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 204. See People v. Woodard, 727 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579–80 (J. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 
2001) (relieving motorist of guilty plea to traffic infraction) (defendant had a restrict-
ed license that was suspended as a result, a point overlooked by all in the process; the 
court invoked unconscionability and found defendant’s plea involuntary). 
 205. See 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1061, 1067 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). 
 206. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 94, at § 274 (offers to plead guilty seem to be 
within the policy of excluding offers to compromise; the trend is to expand exclusion-
ary principle to reach statements during plea bargaining). 
 207. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 153, at § 4:56 (stating that the 
common law “stopped short of excluding unqualified factual admissions” made in 
settlement talks, so lawyers “had to couch their conversations in ‘hypothetical’ or 
‘conditional’ terms”). 
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One accomplishment of the Rules was to remove the necessity of speak-
ing in this convoluted manner.  In both civil and criminal cases, the relevant 
provisions, as we now have them, exclude any “statement” made “during” 
settlement or plea bargaining, so even naked factual utterances are excluda-
ble.208  But while the Rules were being written, plea bargaining statements 
were not on the mind of the framers, and the first draft of Rule 410 spoke of 
withdrawn pleas and “offer[s] to plead guilty or nolo contendere”209 without 
mentioning “statements” at all.  It is not that there was no precedent for ex-
cluding plea bargaining statements as a matter of common law.  There was, 
but the authorities were few.210 
The Rule took its present form in its second published iteration in 1971, 
when it was broadened to reach the withdrawn plea and offer and “statements 
made in connection with” such a plea or offer.211  Between that time and the 
point of enactment in 1975, however, there was much drama and a pitched 
battle in Congress over an issue close to the one that arose twenty years later 
in Mezzanatto.  The story is told elsewhere,212 but here are the important 
points: Forces in the Senate (especially Senator James Eastland from Missis-
sippi, Chair of the Judiciary Committee) were sympathetic to arguments by 
the Justice Department and wanted language approving the impeaching use of 
plea bargaining statements.213  Forces in the House (particularly Representa-
tive Charles Wiggins of California) were determined to block all uses, includ-
ing impeachment.  On this point, there was disagreement in pre-Rules cases 
 
 208. See FRE 408 (covering “a statement made during compromise negotiations,” 
when offered “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim” but 
not covering statements made in connection with claim “by a public office in the 
exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority” if offered later in a 
criminal case); FRE 410 (covering “statement[s]” in plea discussions with “an attor-
ney for the prosecuting authority” if they do not result in guilty plea or lead to “later-
withdrawn guilty plea”). 
 209. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 226 –27 (1969).  
 210. See, e.g., State v. McGunn, 294 N.W. 208, 209 (Minn. 1940) (a conditional 
offer to plead guilty should be treated the same as a withdrawn guilty plea, hence 
excluded from evidence); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 28 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1930) (en banc) (“admissions made expressly for the purpose of effecting a compro-
mise” cannot be proved against their maker) (reversing conviction). 
 211. REVISED DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 51 F.R.D. 315, 355 (1971); RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR 
UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 56 F.R.D. 183, 228 (1973). 
 212. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 153, at § 5:6 (discussing legisla-
tive history). 
 213. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7057 (1974) (setting out version of Rule 410 
allowing use of voluntary and reliable “statements . . . made in court on the record, in 
connection with” withdrawn pleas or offers if offered for impeachment purposes or in 
prosecution for perjury or false statement). 
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too.214  So contentious did the issue become that the effective date of Rule 
410 was set for a month later than the date for the rest of the Rules, in antici-
pation that differences on this point would be worked out in a process going 
forward to amend Criminal Rule 11, which deals with entering guilty pleas in 
criminal cases. 
The outcome of this struggle left no room for doubt on the meaning of 
Rule 410.  In the six months that intervened between enactment of the Rules 
and their effective date, Congress took up and passed both Rule 410 and an 
amendment to Criminal Rule 11 that contained identical language covering 
withdrawn pleas and plea bargaining statements without an “impeachment 
exception.”215  Representative Wiggins sought to drive the point home by use 
of an example that he offered in a colloquy on the floor of the House,216 in 
which a defendant charged with bank robbery admits to a judge, in support of 
his guilty plea, that he did enter the bank with a gun and did take money.  The 
defendant later withdraws the plea with the court’s permission.  At trial, the 
defendant testifies that he was in a different state at the time and “had nothing 
to do with” the robbery.  Can the prosecutor now “make use of the contradic-
tory statements made earlier?”  Wiggins asked.   The answer is no: “The 
adoption of the rule will preclude the prosecutor from impeaching the credi-
bility of the defendant by his prior inconsistent statements, and literally his 
confession in open court.” 
Thus it is clear that Congress intended to block the impeaching use of 
plea bargaining statements against a defendant who ultimately testifies in a 
trial in a manner that conflicts with what he said before.  Mezzanatto recog-
nized this point, and prior appellate decisions were in accord,217 although a 
 
 214. Compare State v. Anonymous, 307 A.2d 785, 786–87 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1973) (approving impeaching use of plea bargaining statements), with Davis v. State, 
308 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1975) (when a court rejects a bargain, defendant can accept a 
different deal offered by the court or go to trial “without any of his admissions, state-
ments, or other evidence given in the plea negotiations being used against him”), and 
State ex rel. Young v. Warren, 536 P.2d 965, 971 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (state-
ments by defendants in failed plea negotiations are inadmissible “on their trial in 
chief, or as rebuttal testimony”), and Moulder v. State, 289 N.E.2d 522, 528 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1972) (citing McGunn, 294 N.W. at 209) (plea bargaining statements are privi-
leged and inadmissible). 
 215. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; FRE 410. 
 216. For the quoted passages set out here, see 121 CONG. REC. 17,492 (daily ed. 
June 6, 1975) (statement of Rep. Wiggins). 
 217. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200 n.2 (1995) (agreeing that 
Rule 410 “give[s] a defendant the right not to be impeached by statements made dur-
ing plea discussions”); accord United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 
1982) (Rule 410 blocks impeaching use of plea bargaining statements).  State deci-
sions agree.  See, e.g., Tyree v. State, 518 N.E.2d 814, 818 & n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) 
(rejecting argument for impeachment exception); State v. Mason, 393 N.W.2d 102, 
102, 104 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (statute says plea bargaining statements are “inadmis-
sible,” which indicates intent to exclude even when offered to impeach); Gillum v. 
State, 681 P.2d 87, 89 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (recognizing no impeachment excep-
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few went the other way,218 and some states adopted versions of Rule 410 that 
allow impeachment.219 
Something else is clear about Rule 410: Its purpose is instrumental.  The 
framers thought an exclusionary principle was necessary to encourage plea 
bargaining.  The rulemakers who drafted Rule 410 had this purpose in 
mind;220 the Senate Report expresses this purpose;221 modern decisions con-
struing the provision recognize it too.222  For reasons developed above, the 
right way to understand this purpose is to grasp that Congress sought to im-
prove the process of plea bargaining by making it fairer.  That is what it 
means to “encourage” plea bargaining, and the argument for achieving this 
purpose does not turn on proving that plea bargaining would become less 
frequent unless the defendant’s statements are excluded under Rule 410. 
The waiver approved by Mezzanatto – and remember that Mezzanatto 
permitted the same impeaching use that Representative Wiggins addressed in 
his example – conflicts with this congressional purpose.  Congress thought 
excluding plea bargaining statements from any trial would encourage plea 
negotiations.  If prosecutors can exact waivers of the protection Congress 
provided, as a condition of opening talks or as part of a deal that ultimately 
falls through, the congressional purpose is frustrated.  As a perceptive ob-
server put it, “Congress would not have enacted Rule 410 if it intended the 
Rule to be circumvented so easily and frequently that circumvention became 
the norm, rather than the exception.”223 
 
tion); State v. Trujillo, 605 P.2d 232, 234–35 (N.M. 1980) (rejecting impeachment 
exception under state counterpart to Rule 410). 
 218. See United States v. Gleason, 766 F.2d 1239, 1245–46 (8th Cir. 1985) (ap-
pearing to accept idea of impeachment exception); see also United States v. Tesack, 
538 F.2d 1068, 1070–71 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding that it was not error for the trial 
court to allow the jury to have a transcript of plea negotiations). 
 219. State v. Hansen, 633 P.2d 1202, 1204–07 (Mont. 1981) (applying state coun-
terpart expressly permitting impeaching use of plea bargaining statements).  But see 
People v. Cole, 584 P.2d 71, 76–78 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (Carrigan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 and the state’s equiva-
lent rule). 
 220. FRE 410 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (stating that the 
purpose is “promotion of disposition of criminal cases by compromise”). 
 221. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7057 (1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule “is 
clearly justified as a means of encouraging pleading”). 
 222. See, e.g., Rachlin v. United States, 723 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(“goal of the rule is to promote active plea negotiations and to encourage frank dis-
cussions” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Grant, 622 
F.2d 308, 312 (1980)); see also United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 682–83 & n.13 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that the reasoning of FRE 410 is to promote negotiated dis-
positions). 
 223. Julia A. Keck, Recent Development, United States v. Sylvester: The Expan-
sion of the Waiver of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 to Allow Case-in-Chief Use of 
Plea Negotiation Statements, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1385, 1399 (2010). 
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2.  Rule 410 Is Not a Default Principle 
There are more down-to-earth reasons why Mezzanatto waivers violate 
the Rules, turning on the language of Rule 410 itself and the mechanisms set 
up by the Rules for objecting or waiving objections to evidence. 
When Mezzanatto reached the Court, Rule 410 said plea bargaining 
statements were excludable “except as otherwise provided” in the Rule it-
self.224  Not surprisingly, the lawyers for Gary Mezzanatto made this point, 
casting it in terms of “plain meaning” and highlighting the many Civil and 
Criminal Rules that expressly provide for adjustments through stipulations 
and agreements.  Rule 410 does contain “express” exceptions.  These pave 
the way to prosecute for perjury or false statement in the case of some plea 
bargaining statements (those made “in court, on the record, in the presence of 
counsel”) and allow their introduction if “another statement” in the same plea 
bargaining has been introduced “if in fairness both statements ought to be 
considered together.”225  And so the conclusion: The absence from Rule 410 
of any reference to stipulations and agreements, and the inclusion of express 
exceptions, mean that stipulations and agreements cannot suspend the exclu-
sionary principle. 
Mezzanatto waivers also evade the mechanism set up in the Rules for 
admitting and excluding evidence.  It is not the case that the rulemakers for-
got to address the matter of waiving rights to exclude evidence.  Under Rule 
103, failing to object at trial waives that right,226 and the Evidence Rules en-
vision trials in which factfinders see and hear actual proof.  It was with this 
point in mind that the Court held in the Old Chief case two years after Mezza-
natto that defendants in criminal cases – and really the Court was speaking of 
all parties in all cases – cannot, generally speaking, confine or cabin the proof 
offered by the opposition by offering to stipulate to whatever that proof might 
show.227  The Rules contemplate that evidence that could be excluded on 
objection may be considered for any purpose that is left open by the failure to 
object at trial (or by making only a limited objection), so statements excluda-
ble as hearsay may be considered, for example, as proof of whatever they 
 
 224. This language was deleted in 2011 in the restyling project, but the restylers 
tell us that the changes were “intended to be stylistic only” and there was “no intent to 
change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.”  FRE 410 advisory com-
mittee’s note to 2011 amendments. 
 225. Rule 410 still contains this exception in slightly changed language that now 
allows prosecutions for perjury or false statement “if the defendant made the state-
ment under oath, on the record, and with counsel present.”  FRE 410(b)(2). 
 226. See FRE 103(a).  But see FRE 103(e) for the exception of “a plain error af-
fecting a substantial right.” 
 227. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186–87 (1997). 
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assert.228  In sum, it is at trial that the Evidence Rules are to be applied, and 
trials are not to be scripted by advance agreements. 
One might argue that the exclusionary principle in Rule 410 is very like 
a privilege.  If it were a privilege, it would be an exception to the general 
principle that objections are to be raised at trial.229  A privilege would have to 
be claimed before trial in settings like depositions or hearings or even plea 
bargaining sessions, and there would be a fair argument that disclosure 
waived any claim of protection.  But in fact the whole purpose of Rule 410 is 
to allow conversations that include disclosures.  And in fact courts have con-
sidered the question whether Rule 410 creates a privilege and have concluded 
that it does not.230  Hence plea bargaining statements may be subject to dis-
covery, and disclosures to outsiders do not waive a defendant’s right to ex-
clude plea bargaining statements under Rule 410.  In short, the protections 
offered by Rule 410 are intended to operate at trial and are not subject to an 
obligation to claim at the earliest opportunity. 
V.  THERE IS A BETTER WAY 
The better way is the one envisioned by Congress in enacting Rule 410, 
and it can be said simply.  Plea bargaining statements by the accused should 
be excludable from trial if negotiations lead nowhere, produce a bargain from 
which either side withdraws, end when a court refuses to accept a proposed 
plea, or produce a plea from which the defendant withdraws with the court’s 
permission.  Negotiations should proceed under the recognition that the ex-
clusion of plea bargaining statements should not be a mere default rule that is 
only enforceable absent a waiver.  In sum, negotiation, agreement, plea, and 
waiver should be seen as being of a piece in accord with the unitary principle: 
If they do not succeed in resolving the case, whatever charges are brought 
should go forward as if nothing had happened. 
A.  If Plea and Agreement Fail to Resolve Case, Waiver Should Be 
Inoperative 
Almost a century ago, the Supreme Court offered a better vision of plea 
bargaining than we find in Mezzanatto.  The question before the Court in 
1927 in the Kercheval case was whether the prosecutor could use against the 
defendant a guilty plea that he had been allowed to withdraw because the 
prosecutor had promised him a three-month jail sentence (plus a $1000 fine), 
 
 228. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 153, at § 8:5 (When hearsay is admit-
ted, it “may be considered by the trier in determining the facts and reaching a verdict 
or decision.”). 
 229. Id. at § 11:4. 
 230. Doe No. 1 v. United States, 749 F.3d 999, 1007–08 (11th Cir. 2014) (FRE 
410 does not create a privilege.). 
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but the trial court had sentenced him to three years in federal prison.231  The 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that a plea of guilty with-
drawn by permission is inadmissible at a later trial.  Allowing withdrawal, 
said the Supreme Court, is “to adjudge that the plea of guilty be held for 
naught,” and a plea that was annulled has “ceased to be evidence.”  Even 
more important is the Supreme Court’s observation that the withdrawn plea 
could not be admitted “without putting [the defendant] in a dilemma utterly 
inconsistent” with the decision allowing him to withdraw the plea, as its use 
in evidence at his later trial “may have turned the scale against him.”232  We 
can note in passing that Rule 410 excludes a withdrawn plea of guilty from 
the later criminal trial, thus codifying the holding of Kercheval.  Of course 
enforcing a Mezzanatto waiver produces very nearly the same evil that 
Kercheval sought to prevent.233 
This early expression of what we have called the unitary principle holds 
that the various parts of a deal – agreement, plea, and now waiver – should be 
viewed as part of a single transaction whose aim on both sides is to resolve 
criminal matters without trial.  When the effort fails, plea and agreement ob-
viously fail and drop out of the picture.  So too should the waiver.   
This principle continues to be recognized in post-Mezzanatto opinions.  
One example is the decision in the Jim case in 2015.234  There, a panel of the 
Tenth Circuit enforced a waiver after the trial court let the defendant with-
draw the plea, which led to trial, conviction, and appeal.  The reviewing court 
acknowledged that it was reaching an internally conflicted result (plea with-
drawn, waiver enforced) but chalked it up to the peculiarities of the rules 
governing appeals: The court acknowledged that it was inconsistent to let a 
defendant withdraw his plea while enforcing his waiver, and “one of the two” 
rulings is wrong.  But only the ruling on the waiver was before the court, as 
the decision allowing the defendant to withdraw the plea and go to trial was 
not an appealable order, and the review of the order enforcing the waiver was 
folded into the review of the conviction! 
This conclusion involves something close to logic chopping (the court 
could surely have concluded that the waiver should not have been enforced), 
and elsewhere the court managed to engage in still more fancy footwork.  A 
trial court can let the defendant withdraw a plea for any “fair and just” reason, 
the court said, but waivers are enforceable as long as they are part of a plea 
that is “knowing and voluntary.”  This interpretation mistakenly reads the 
Mezzanatto proviso as stating the only ground for ignoring a waiver, and it 
drives a wedge between the “fair and just” standard that applies when the 
defendant seeks to withdraw his plea and the constitutional “knowing and 
 
 231. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 221 (1927). 
 232. Id. at 224; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, at § 21.5(f) (reporting that 
“the more recent state decisions” agree with Kercheval). 
 233. Rule 410 provides that “a guilty plea that was later withdrawn” is inadmissi-
ble in later civil or criminal cases.  FRE 410(a)(1). 
 234. United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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voluntary” standard that entitles the defendant to do so.  That is exactly what 
the decision in the Jim case succeeded in doing: Implicitly at least, it found 
the waiver valid because there was no constitutional violation even though 
the trial judge had found that fairness required the court to let the defendant 
withdraw the plea.235  Other modern decisions embrace the idea that failing to 
terminate the case with an effective plea should mean that prior negotiations 
no longer have any impact on the case, whether the reason is that the defend-
ant or the prosecutor withdraws from the agreement, the court refuses to ac-
cept the plea, or the defendant enters but later withdraws the plea.236 
This vision informed by the unitary principle is the right one and is sub-
stantially better than the world we inhabit today.  This vision treats plea bar-
gaining very much the same way that we treat civil settlement negotiations 
today and honors the purpose and letter of Rule 410. 
B.  Both Substantive and Impeaching Uses Should Be Blocked 
Even if substantive use of the defendant’s plea bargaining statements 
should be disallowed for the reasons set forth in this Article, it might be 
thought that the impeaching use should be allowed.  After all, important ex-
clusionary principles give way to allow use of evidence to contradict or cor-
rect trial testimony, helping to prevent the trier of fact from being misled and 
shedding light on the credibility of witnesses.  Thus statements that would 
otherwise be excluded as hearsay may be used to contradict and impeach, and 
the same is true of evidence that would otherwise be excluded under the rule 
 
 235. Id. at 807–08, 813 & n.5 (the judge let the defendant withdraw a plea be-
cause he still thought he would have a trial on guilt or innocence, then correctly en-
forced Mezzanatto waiver). 
 236. United States v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 182–83, 185 (1st Cir. 2007) (in 
withdrawing plea, defendant did not breach agreement; court erred in ruling his 
statements admissible; allowing withdrawal was proper, and negating that order 
“would not only harm the defendant’s rights, but would also undermine the conclu-
siveness” of the ruling) (“providing some protection for defendants from pleas gone 
awry fosters plea bargaining by encouraging openness and honesty during plea nego-
tiations”); United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d 55, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2003) (court 
refused the plea and should have excluded statements; defendant was “deprived of the 
benefit of his plea bargain” but government used statements made in reliance on it; 
parties should be returned “status quo ante”); State v. Amidon, 967 A.2d 1126, 1135 
(Vt. 2008) (it is error to admit statements made in connection with a plea agreement 
after defendant was allowed to withdraw) (statements and plea are to be treated as if 
they were never made if plea is withdrawn; both in-court and out-of-court proceed-
ings are integral and cannot be separated); People v. Alt, 854 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“where a defendant’s plea is withdrawn, it is out of the case 
for all purposes and the People may not use the plea or the contents of the plea allocu-
tion” in case-in-chief or to impeach) (the court refused to accept plea because some of 
defendant’s statements raised doubt as to his guilt); State v. Trujillo, 605 P.2d 232, 
235 (N.M. 1980) (if a plea is entered and later withdrawn, “at trial it is to appear as 
though the earlier plea and/or plea discussions never took place”). 
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barring use of character evidence, as well as evidence gathered in violation of 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. 
Still, there are at least four reasons to shut the door even to the impeach-
ing use of plea bargaining statements against criminal defendants. 
First, even the limited impeaching use of plea bargaining statements ap-
proved in Mezzanatto puts up an obstacle that discourages a defendant from 
testifying at all, including one who plans to stick closely to the truth.  For 
reasons described in this Article, the pressures on a defendant in plea bargain-
ing ensure that some of what he says is purposefully cast in the direction of 
incriminating himself, even if achieving this purpose requires overstatement.  
Faced with the warning that a defendant may have to explain such statements, 
a defense lawyer is likely to advise his client that adequate explanation is 
impossible and that the very attempt to explain will likely uncover further 
details of criminality and reveal the very fact that the defendant tried to reach 
a deal, which itself suggests guilt to anyone not familiar with the process. 
Second, for the defendant brave enough to testify, the impact of ques-
tions bringing out what he said during plea discussions is likely to extend 
well beyond casting doubt on his credibility.  While the difference between 
impeaching and substantive uses of statements is basic to American evidence 
law, factfinders (particularly juries) are unlikely to maintain the distinction 
faithfully.  A defendant who testifies to any point bearing on the charges 
against him may not only be disbelieved but also convicted by the very 
statements he made when he thought he was helping himself avoid trial.  This 
use of out-of-court statements is viewed as nonhearsay and allowed, subject 
only to the power to exclude for undue prejudice under Rule 403.237 
Third, the accommodation for impeachment that we find in other doc-
trines does not provide enlightenment on the question whether plea bargain-
ing statements should be usable for that purpose.  The hearsay doctrine 
would, after all, put no limits at all on the use of the defendant’s own state-
ments against him.  The limited accommodation in the hearsay doctrine that 
allows the impeaching (but not substantive) use of nonparty witness state-
ments applies to proof that is far less likely to be devastating to defendants, 
and the Court has recognized the uniquely damaging nature of the defend-
ant’s own statements.  The rules on character evidence allow for refutation 
and testing, but they come into play only where a defendant opens up the 
subject by offering his own good character as proof of innocence.238  This 
accommodation in no way restricts the defendant in testifying to the acts giv-
ing rise to the charges against him.239  Finally, the use of evidence collected 
illegally under the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments240 for impeachment 
 
 237. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 153, at § 8:19. 
 238. See FRE 404(a). 
 239. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 153, at § 4:43. 
 240. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 345–46 (1990) (statements taken in viola-
tion of Sixth Amendment can be used to impeach); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 
620, 627–28 (1980) (evidence gathered in violation of Fourth Amendment can be 
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purposes is designed to calibrate the incentives operating on police and pros-
ecutors in the areas covered by those provisions, and this accommodation has 
little or nothing to do with the present subject – achieving fairness in the plea 
bargaining process. 
Fourth, Congress addressed the matter at hand and decisively rejected 
the use of plea bargaining statements for impeachment purposes, as described 
above.  If Mezzanatto waivers are not to be enforced – and this Article argues 
that they should not be enforced in most cases that go to trial – there is simply 
no room to argue that plea bargaining statements should be admitted to im-
peach.  Congress reached the right solution: Excluding plea bargaining state-
ments is critical to the integrity and fairness of the system, and the parties 
should return to the beginning point if negotiation fails to resolve the case.  In 
short, barring even the impeaching use of plea bargaining statements is the 
right thing to do despite the clear utility more generally of allowing use of 
prior statements to impeach.  Here is a place to depart from the more general 
approach to impeachment. 
Now it is useful to pause and look at the decisions that not only follow 
Mezzanatto but also extend the decision by approving the substantive use of 
plea bargaining statements covered by waivers.  The first authoritative deci-
sion to take this course was the Burch case in 1998, in an opinion by a distin-
guished panel of the District of Columbia Circuit.241  Judge Wald wrote that 
Mezzanatto turned on three principles: First, waivers of statutory protections 
are “presumptively enforceable.”  Second, Congress did not intend “to pre-
clude or to limit” waiver of the protections of Rule 410 (and the correspond-
ing Criminal Rule).  Third, “public policy” points toward enforcing a broader 
waiver.  Hence Mezzanatto does not support “drawing any distinction” be-
tween impeaching and substantive uses.  Rule 410 (and the corresponding 
Criminal Rule) protects “personal” and “institutional” interests, but the insti-
tutional concern of encouraging “candid plea discussions” does not support a 
distinction between impeaching and substantive uses.  Nor, the court asserted, 
have any reasons been advanced supporting the conclusion that waivers cov-
ering case-in-chief use of plea bargaining statements would have a “markedly 
greater impact” than impeachment waivers on the willingness of defendants 
to participate in plea discussions.242  Most post-Burch decisions have ap-
proved extending waivers to the substantive (or case-in-chief) use of plea 
bargaining statements,243 although a few appear to approve only waivers cov-
ering impeachment and at least cast doubt on substantive waivers.244 
 
admitted to impeach); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224–26 (1971) (statements 
gathered in violation of Fifth Amendment can be used to impeach). 
 241. United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1320–21 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 242. Id. at 1322 (opinion by Judge Wald with Judges Williams and Tatel on the 
panel). 
 243. See United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hardwick, 544 
F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Mergen, No. 06–CR–352 (NGG), 2010 
WL 395974, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2010); United States v. Nesbitt, No. 2:08–CR–
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In one sense, Burch was right.  In trials where the defendant testifies, the 
damage done by allowing substantive use may not be much greater than the 
damage done by allowing only impeaching use.  Still, Burch too is wrongly 
decided.  It misstates the purpose of Rule 410, which is to encourage fairness 
in the plea bargaining process, not to increase the number of times when plea 
bargaining goes forward (which can hardly be increased beyond its already 
high level).  Burch is also mistaken, just as Mezzanatto was mistaken, in con-
cluding that Congress did not intend to “preclude or limit” waivers.  Burch 
undervalues the difference between impeaching and substantive uses, a dis-
tinction that remains fundamental in American evidence law.  To say that 
waiver doctrine does not support “drawing any distinction” between impeach-
ing and substantive uses is another example of logic chopping.  There are 
other reasons for drawing such a distinction, even if they do not constitute 
part of “waiver” doctrine: If the defendant does not plan to testify for some 
other reasons – a common one being prior convictions that can be used to 
impeach veracity – enforcing a substantive waiver means the prosecutor has 
positive evidence that can be used to convict.  In contrast, limiting the waiver 
means the prosecutor cannot make any use of what the defendant conceded in 
plea bargaining.  A moment’s reflection yields the conclusion that enforcing a 
limited waiver has less adverse impact on the quality of plea bargaining than 
enforcing a broad waiver. 
Here a digression is in order: The waiver in Mezzanatto was oral, and 
the Court said it covered impeachment of the defendant if he testified incon-
sistently with his plea bargaining statements.245  Today waivers are in writing.  
Sometimes they are limited to impeachment, but often waivers, even when 
they stop short of authorizing use during the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, reach 
 
1153–DCN, 2010 WL 3701337, at *3–6 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2010); United States v. 
Annette, No. 2:10–cr–131, 2012 WL 1890237, at *4 (D. Vt. May 22, 2012); United 
States v. Stevens, No. 2:09–cr–00222–11, 2010 WL 5343189, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 
21, 2010); People v. Stevens, 610 N.W.2d 881, 886–87 (Mich. 2000); State v. Wills, 
762 S.E.2d 3, 3 (S.C. 2014); State v. Campoy, 207 P.3d 792, 803 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2009); State v. Rafferty, No. 26724, 2015 WL 1932693, at *12–14 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Apr. 29, 2015).  But see United States v. Kowalewski, No. 2:13–CR–00045–RWS, 
2014 WL 6667127, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2014) (plea agreement at issue was 
ambiguous concerning waiver of FRE 410; therefore the court granted defendant’s 
motion to suppress evidence of the plea agreement); United States v. Mitchell, No. 
4:10–CR–57, 2010 WL 5490771, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2010) (preventing federal 
prosecutor from using plea agreement negotiated previously with state prosecutor in 
its case-in-chief). 
 244. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 169 P.3d 223, 227–28 (Colo. App. 2007) (allow-
ing impeaching use and labeling substantive use as “palpably unfair”). 
 245. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 198 (1995); see also United 
States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2015) (waiver covered only use of 
proffer statements to cross-examine and impeach defendant, not other witnesses for 
defense). 
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deeper into areas of rebuttal.246  These waivers already authorize a kind of 
“substantive” use of what the defendant said before.  It is one thing to use his 
statements to impeach his own testimony, where the theory is that differences 
between what he says now and what he says before show vacillation, hence 
the possibility of errors or lies in his testimony, without being taken as proof 
of what it asserts.  It is another thing to use his statements to disprove what-
ever his lawyer argues or other witnesses say on the stand, where the state-
ments tend to refute (hence “impeach”) other evidence given in the case.  The 
Court has recognized this distinction in another context.247  Courts construing 
waivers sometimes recognize this point too and conclude that a waiver that 
speaks of impeachment does not include a go-ahead to use defendant’s state-
ments to contradict other witnesses.248  But some decisions persist in approv-
ing the use of plea bargaining statements for this purpose of refutation, while 
purporting to observe the impeachment limit.249  Once again, broader waivers 
cause more damage to plea bargaining than narrower waivers. 
C.  Both Proffer and Plea Waivers Should Be Invalid 
As between proffer waivers and plea bargain waivers, the former are the 
more egregious instance of prosecutorial overreach because they ask the de-
fendant to give up something he cannot adequately appraise (he does not 
know what will be said, where the conversation will lead, or what charges are 
contemplated).  But even plea bargain waivers (which often operate on state-
ments yet to be made as well) amount to overreach and are damaging to de-
fendants and the process.  In both instances, the defendant assures his own 
conviction as the cost of making or trying to make a deal that is not final and 
may never become final.  In the case of proffer waivers, the attempt to make a 
deal may fail.  In the case of plea bargain waivers, the deal may not resolve 
the case because (a) one or the other party withdraws, (b) the court refuses to 
accept the plea, or (c) the defendant is allowed to withdraw the plea. 
 
 246. United States v. Shannon, 803 F.3d 778, 780, 781, 784–85 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(allowing use of defendant’s statements “to rebut any evidence offered by your client 
that is inconsistent with the statements made during this discussion”); United States v. 
Wainwright, 89 F. Supp. 3d 950, 959 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (covering use of statements 
“for impeachment, cross-examination and rebuttal in any future proceedings,” and the 
latter “includes [i]n-court contradiction of an adverse party’s evidence” (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But see United States v. Brooks, No. 
14-382 (RMB), 2015 WL 6509016, at *1–3 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2015) (granting defend-
ant’s motion to preclude statements made during proffer meeting). 
 247. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 318 (1990) (refusing to allow expansion of 
impeachment exception to cover use of statements taken from defendant in violation 
of Fourth Amendment to impeach other witnesses because doing so would discourage 
defendants from offering their best defense). 
 248. See, e.g., Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 16 (impeachment waiver did not 
cover use of defendant’s statements in cross-examining other witnesses). 
 249. E.g., United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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Thus, all four arguments advanced in this Article point to the conclusion 
that these waivers should not be honored: They make plea bargaining unfair 
and magnify its dysfunctionality; they produce untrustworthy statements; 
they amount to unenforceable contracts; they violate Rule 410. 
Of course prosecutors object to this conclusion, if for no other reason 
that moving in this direction will substantially reduce their powers over de-
fendants.  They have a slightly more persuasive argument as well: They claim 
to need durable waivers to ensure that they get from the defendant infor-
mation they can trust and stress the difficulties that they face in deciding 
whether to compromise in the larger interest of convicting more serious of-
fenders (Mezzanatto recognized these difficulties).250  It is true that if the 
prosecutor and the defendant reach an agreement that calls for cooperation by 
the defendant in the trials of other offenders, prosecutors need to be sure that 
the deal will do what it is supposed to do: If the court accepts the deal and the 
other trials have yet to go forward, the prosecutor has less leverage to obtain 
promised testimony.251  The best way to achieve that goal, prosecutors argue, 
is to be sure that the defendant commits to whatever he discloses in proffer 
sessions, and the best way to ensure his commitment is to bind him to what 
he says so that waffling later becomes costly.252 
But the prosecutor’s argument fails for many reasons, which collectively 
demonstrate that the prosecutor does not need Mezzanatto waivers to secure 
her goal.  For one thing, she can set up a plea deal with a cooperating defend-
ant that contemplates deferred sentencing, so the defendant must testify in 
other proceedings before receiving his own sentence, and the sentence rec-
ommendation can be contingent on such cooperation.253  Secondly, it is at 
least likely that the prosecutor can use against the defendant, in the event that 
a trial becomes necessary, any testimony that he gives in performing his obli-
gations under the plea agreement.254 
Thirdly, the prosecutor has a defense to her own performance of a plea 
agreement if the defendant is in material breach by failing to deliver promised 
 
 250. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 207. 
 251. For an excellent discussion of this matter, see generally Graham Hughes, 
Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
 252. United States v. Gomez, 210 F. Supp. 2d 465, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“prose-
cutors will be reluctant to enter into cooperation agreements” unless assured “that the 
defendant will tell the truth, and if a defendant knows that his statements cannot later 
be used against him (unless he testifies), he may be more likely to embellish and lie” 
in proffer sessions). 
 253. See United States v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 285 (7th Cir. 1999) (bribery 
statute does not require exclusion of testimony given under promise of criminal im-
munity or reduced sentence); Gleason v. McKune, No. 11–3110–SAC, 2012 WL 
2952242, at *9 (D. Kan. July 19, 2012) (plea agreements conditional on testifying 
“are not impermissible inducements to lie”). 
 254. United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 731–32 (2d Cir. 1978) (defendant’s 
prior testimony in grand jury proceedings pursuant to plea agreement that defendant 
later abrogated was admissible against him). 
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cooperation, and even a court’s acceptance of a guilty plea can be rescinded if 
the defendant fails to perform the obligations created by the plea agreement.  
In this event, the prosecutor is released from her obligations under the plea 
agreement and can file new and additional charges or recommend more se-
vere punishment.255 
Fourth, the prosecutor’s argument rests on the false premise that what 
the defendant says is truthful and reliable because he commits himself to it.  
In fact plea bargaining statements are not reliable for reasons developed in 
this Article – the defendant incriminates himself because he must in order to 
make a deal and signing the waiver is another step toward the deal, not an 
assurance that what has been said should be believed.  Fifth and finally, it is 
(to put it mildly) unclear why the system should expect truthfulness from 
defendants when it does nothing to enforce truthfulness on the part of prose-
cutors.256 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prosecutors actually resemble those compelling figures that we remem-
ber from the Godfather movies for reasons other than their wielding of power 
over others.  As portrayed by actors like Brando, De Niro, and Pacino, the 
Corleones are engaging and compelling figures because they are loyal and 
devoted to their wives and families and shrewd and persevering in dealing 
with cruel realities in the world.257  So a natural response includes some 
grudging measure of admiration, however much we recoil from the underly-
ing violence and criminality.  To some extent, we expect prosecutors to care 
with similar perseverance for the public families they represent and protect. 
 
 255. See State v. Lewis, 779 S.E.2d 643, 649 (Ga. 2015) (on defendant’s material 
breach, court could set aside plea bargain, and court would be relieved of duty to 
sentence in accordance with prosecutor’s recommendation); Falero v. State, 69 A.3d 
1210, 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (defendant’s breach by absconding entitled 
state to vacate plea agreement returned the case to “square one, as if the guilty plea 
had never been entered”); State v. Armstrong, 35 P.3d 397, 400–01 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001) (plea agreement allowed prosecutor to file other charges if defendant breached; 
defendant did breach, and prosecutor could file those charges). 
 256. See United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 294 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding 
Mezzanatto waiver but noting possibility of “misrepresentations or manufactured 
evidence that overbear the will of the defendant”). 
 257. See THE GODFATHER (Alfran Productions 1972) (film directed by Francis 
Ford Coppola, with Marlon Brando as Don Vito Corleone and Al Pacino as Michael 
Corleone; winner of three Academy Awards, five Golden Globes, and one Grammy), 
followed by THE GODFATHER PART II (The Coppola Company 1974) (also directed by 
Coppola, with Robert De Niro as the younger Don Vito Corleone and Al Pacino as 
the older Michael Corleone; winner of six Academy Awards, including Best Picture), 
both based on MARIO PUZO, THE GODFATHER (1969), which was followed by MARIO 
PUZO, THE SICILIAN (1984), and then followed after Puzo’s death by ED FALCO, THE 
FAMILY CORLEONE (2012). 
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Still, the naked power of the fictional Corleones is a big part of the take-
away from Mario Puzo’s compelling stories, and we ask of prosecutors more 
respect for fairness than we see in the bosses of Cosa Nostra that the novels 
and movies depict.  The fairness that we expect cannot exist in an environ-
ment of Mezzanatto waivers that are part and parcel of modern plea bargain-
ing.  These waivers contribute significantly to major negative externalities of 
plea bargaining, including overcharging, over-convicting, and overincarcera-
tion; they also produce unreliable statements that are then used to justify 
guilty pleas; they rest on contracts that should not be enforceable; they violate 
the letter of Rule 410 and frustrate the underlying congressional purpose. 
Mezzanatto acknowledged that waivers are not enforceable when they 
violate constitutional norms that require pleas and plea agreements to be 
knowing and voluntary, and the opinion leaves room to invalidate waivers for 
other reasons.  Disappointingly, courts have mostly not taken advantage of 
this opening and have tended to enforce Mezzanatto waivers in all four of the 
situations in which they can operate – when bargaining fails to produce 
agreement, when agreement is reached but one side or the other withdraws, 
when courts do not accept pleas tendered pursuant to agreement, and when 
the defendant is allowed to withdraw a plea.  Mezzanatto leaves room for 
things to change, and the situation would improve if these waivers were made 
inoperative across the board. 
APPENDIX 1 
Federal Cases Approving Waivers Covering Use of Defendant’s 
Statements in Prosecutor’s Case-in-Chief 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: United States v. Burch, 
156 F.3d 1315, 1320–24 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (approving use of plea bar-
gaining statements in government’s case-in-chief; waiver principles do not 
support distinction between impeaching and substantive uses). 
First Circuit: United States v. DeLaurentiis, 638 F. Supp. 2d 76, 77–78 
(D. Me. 2009) (enforcing waiver that covers all uses of defendant’s plea bar-
gaining statements). 
Second Circuit: United States v. Mergen, No. 06–CR–352 (NGG), 2010 
WL 395974, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2010) (enforcing waiver allowing use of 
defendant’s plea bargaining statements in government’s case-in-chief). 
Fourth Circuit: United States v. Nesbitt, No. 2:08–CR–1153–DCN, 
2010 WL 3701337, at *5–6 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2010) (enforcing waiver and 
authorizing government to offer defendant’s statements during its case-in-
chief). 
Fifth Circuit: United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 289–91 (5th Cir. 
2009) (enforcing waiver allowing use against defendant of his plea bargain-
ing statements during government’s case-in-chief). 
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Sixth Circuit: United States v. Fifer, 206 F. App’x 502, 509–10 (6th Cir. 
2006) (enforcing waiver in proffer letter allowing of defendant’s statements 
during government’s case-in-chief). 
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 909–11 (8th Cir. 
2000) (entitling government to use defendant’s plea bargaining statements “in 
its case against” defendant). 
United States v. Stevens, No. 2:09–cr–00222–11, 2010 WL 5343189, at 
*3 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 21, 2010) (paving the way to allow use of stipulation of 
facts during government’s case-in-chief). 
United States v. Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1029–30 (N.D. Iowa 
2010) (allowing all uses of stipulated facts during trial). 
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Rubio, No. CR 08–954–PHX–JAT, 2009 
WL 1186245, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 28, 2009) (covering substantive uses of 
statements). 
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 813 & n.6 (10th Cir. 
2015) (after defendant withdrew guilty plea with court’s permission, prosecu-
tor could introduce his plea bargaining statements; waiver did not limit gov-
ernment to impeachment, and allowed use during government’s case-in-
chief). 
United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th Cir. 2011) (enforc-
ing waiver allowing government to use defendant’s statements during gov-
ernment’s case-in-chief). 
APPENDIX 2 
Federal Cases Approving Waivers Covering  
Refutation of Defense Evidence 
 
Second Circuit: United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 163–64 (2d Cir. 
2011) (enforcing waiver permitting government to use defendant’s statements 
to rebut any evidence offered or elicited, or factual assertions made on behalf 
of defendant). 
United States v. Rivera, 117 F. Supp. 3d 172, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(government promised not to use defendant’s statements during its case-in-
chief but reserved right to use them to cross-examine defendant and rebut 
evidence offered on his behalf.). 
United States v. Paris, No. 3:06–cr–0064 (CFD), 2007 WL 1158118, at 
*5 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2007) (covering use in rebuttal of defendant’s state-
ments but not use during government’s direct case). 
Third Circuit: United States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 568–70 (3d Cir. 
2008) (under waiver covering impeachment and rebuttal, government could 
use defendant’s proffer statements to refute evidence adduced by defendant in 
cross-examining government witnesses). 
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Shannon, 803 F.3d 778, 781, 783 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (proffer agreement waived right to exclude statements “to rebut 
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any evidence offered by your client that is inconsistent with the statements 
made during this discussion”). 
United States v. Wainwright, 89 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957–59 (S.D. Ohio 
2015) (allowing government to use defendant’s statements for impeachment, 
on cross, and to rebut testimony by defense witnesses). 
Seventh Circuit: United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 
1998) (proffer waiver entitled government to use defendant’s statements to 
refute evidence adduced by defense on cross-examination of government 
witnesses). 
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Yielding, No. 4:08CR00213 BSM, 2009 
WL 801780, at *2–4 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 25, 2009) (covering use of defendant’s 
statements as rebuttal evidence and impeachment if he testifies). 
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 407 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(allowing use of defendant’s statements in prosecutor’s case-in-rebuttal; not 
reaching question whether statements could have been used in case-in-chief). 
APPENDIX 3 
Federal Cases Approving Waivers Covering  
Impeachment of Defendant 
 
First Circuit: U.S. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(language of the waiver covered use of proffer statements to cross-examine 
and impeach defendant if he testifies but not use of proffer statements in ex-
amining defense witnesses). 
Second Circuit: United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 118–19, 121 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (waiver reached use of defendant’s statements to rebut evidence 
offered or elicited, or factual assertions made, by or on behalf of defendant). 
United States v. Chan, 185 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(enforcing waiver for proffer statements and allowing government agent to 
testify to what defendant said in proffer session; proffer statements could be 
used to impeach defendant). 
Third Circuit: United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1396 (3d Cir. 
1991) (proffer agreement says information provided by defendant may not be 
used “directly against her, except for the purpose of cross-examination or 
impeachment should she be a witness”) (plea agreements “commonly con-
tain” such a provision). 
United States v. Burnett, No. 08–201–03, 2009 WL 2180373, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. July 17, 2009) (allowing use of plea bargaining statements to im-
peach defendant if he testifies but not to contradict other evidence offered on 
defendant’s behalf). 
United States v. Ford, No. 04–0562 (JBS), 2005 WL 1129497, at *5 
(D.N.J. May 11, 2005) (allowing use of defendant’s statements on cross-
examination and in rebuttal of defense evidence). 
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Seventh Circuit: United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1067–68 (7th Cir. 
1993) (enforcing waiver of objection to use of proffer statements if he testi-
fies inconsistently at trial). 
United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1409 (7th Cir. 1992) (en-
forcing waiver in proffer letter of right to exclude defendant’s statements, 
offered to impeach). 
APPENDIX 4 
States with Reported Cases Recognizing Waivers Covering Both Im-
peaching and Substantive Use 
Arizona: State v. Campoy, 207 P.3d 792, 803–04 (Ariz. App. 2009) (en-
forcing proffer waiver allowing use of statements during state’s case-in-chief 
after state withdrew from agreement because defendant had lied). 
California: People v Scheller, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447, 453–54 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (suggesting in dictum that defendant’s plea bargaining statements 
would be admissible after she withdrew her plea if agreement had so speci-
fied). 
Kentucky: Porter v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 382, 391 (Ky. 2011) 
(noting in dictum decisions holding that defendant may waive right to ex-
clude plea bargaining statements). 
Michigan: People v. Stevens, 610 N.W.2d 881, 886–87 (Mich. 2000) 
(approving Mezzanatto waiver allowing prosecutor to use plea bargaining 
statements during case-in-chief). 
Minnesota: State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 617–18, 620 (Minn. 2004) 
(approving use, under Mezzanatto waiver, of defendant’s plea bargaining 
statements for purposes of obtaining indictment; broad language approving 
waiver). 
Mississippi: McGowan v. State, 706 So. 2d 231, 239–41 (Miss. 1997) 
(defendant pled guilty and was sentenced, but plea was vacated when he re-
fused to testify against others; plea bargaining statements were admissible). 
Ohio: State v. Rafferty, No. 26724, 2015 WL 1932693, at *12–13 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015) (plea agreement authorized use in prosecutor’s case-
in-chief of defendant’s statements, after defendant declined to plead guilty as 
agreed). 
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Widmer, 120 A.3d 1023, 1028 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2015) (rights secured by Rule 410 are waivable; no indication that 
waiver was dependent on defendant taking the stand). 
South Carolina: State v. Wills, 762 S.E.2d 3, 4 (S.C. 2014) (enforcing 
waiver when the prosecutor broke off negotiations after defendant failed a lie 
detector; defendant’s statements were admissible in state’s case-in-chief). 
South Dakota: State v. Stevenson, 652 N.W.2d 735, 737, 742 (S.D. 
2002) (where defendant breached plea agreement, waiver allowed use of his 
statements in trial on more serious charges). 
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APPENDIX 5 
States with Reported Cases Limiting or 
 Restricting Use of Mezzanatto Waivers 
 
Colorado: People v. Garcia, 169 P.3d 223, 227–28 (Colo. App. 2007) 
(covering impeaching use) (penalizing defendant for his cooperation in taking 
lie detector test “by introducing his statements as substantive proof of guilt is 
palpably unfair and undermines the public policy of encouraging fair com-
promises”). 
Maryland: State v. Pitt, 891 A.2d 312, 325–26 (Md. 2006) (Mezzanatto 
waivers are enforceable if defendant breaches plea agreement but not if the 
state does). 
New Jersey: State v. Williams, 135 A.3d 157, 163–66 & n.7 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2016) (Mezzanatto allows defendant to waive right to exclude 
plea bargaining statement when offered to impeach; noting but not reaching 
question whether waiver can authorize case-in-chief usage). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
